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ABSTRACT
Many scholars argue that global forces, such as increased economic integration into the
global economy or interventions from international aid agencies, are directly affecting the
governance of municipalities. This paper explores the process by which international
influences affect local governance by using the history of a single institution, the Tamil
Nadu Slum Clearance Board in Chennai, India, and examining the evolution of the
Board's policies towards slums and slum clearance from 1970 to the present. In its early
years, state level political party incentives determined the shelter policies of the Board.
The World Bank donated significant amounts of money to the Board for projects in low-
income shelter provision between 1975 and 1996, and attempted to significantly change
shelter sector policies in the city. However, the Bank faced a great deal of resistance in
imposing reforms on the Board. It was not until they radically changed institutional
structures within the Board to cut ties with local political parties that they were able to
successfully implement policy reform. The history of the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance
Board suggests that institutional structures are of great importance when trying to
understand the way in which international influences affect local governance.
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CHAPTER 1:
Stating the Case
Introduction
When the British first arrived in the area now known as Chennai, the capital city
of the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, the fishermen were already there. Their
villages dotted the shoreline, and their boats helped to bring people and goods from
British ships that laid anchor far from the rough surf of the harbor.' When the city grew,
it grew around these villages.
The fishermen have remained a tight knit community till today. For many decades
after India's independence, despite their evident poverty, these fishermen enjoyed some
measure of access to political power. They received jobs in the government and access to
money and resources through various social welfare schemes. In the early 1970s, the
fishermen's villages were reclassified as slums, and the government replaced their
clusters of thatched roof huts with concrete tenements. However, the population of
fishermen has grown over the years, and their extended families - their children and
grandchildren - have spilled out of the tenements and built more huts around them.
Today, a line of huts and aging concrete tenements runs along the Chennai coast broken
only by the port and Fort St. George in the North of the city, and the white sands of the
Marina Beach. The fishermen of Chennai faced few serious threats of eviction even
though most lack proper title to their land, partly because of their strength as a voting
bloc that no political party could afford to alienate.2
1 Joseph Franco, "Madras as a Naval Base," The Madras Tercentenary Commemoration
Volume (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1939) 22.
2 Rangasamy, Srinivasapuram, Personal interview, 20 Jul. 2007; The protection from
eviction that the fishermen in Chennai enjoyed was common across India. In studies of
slum dwellers across the world, those in India stood out because of their intention to stay
in their squatter settlements, and to upgrade their self-provided, informal housing. From
The tsunami in December of 2004 destroyed property and homes in many of the
fishing villages within the city, and in one village, it killed fifty people. After the
devastation of the wave, the fishermen faced a new threat: the government. Declaring the
coastal lands to be unsafe for human habitation, the government attempted to resettle the
fishermen inland, in hastily built resettlement colonies on the outskirts of the city, far
from the ocean, the fishermen's primary source of livelihood.3 The fishermen protested,
but many of them were moved anyway. For those that remained, the struggle to hold onto
their lands continues. Many of the residents of these coastal communities were puzzled.
The same political parties were in power with the same political leaders. Why did the
fishermen suddenly lose their long held right to land that had been in their control, in
some cases, for centuries?
This was the same time that Chennai, along with India as a whole, became more
integrated into the global economy. Its IT services sector became extremely successful,
and numerous multi-national corporations chose to locate their back-end operations in the
city.4 The city began to profit from international and domestic investment in upscale
Amanda Perry, "Law and Urban Change in an Indian City," Illegal Cities: Law and
Urban Change in Developing Countries ed. Edesio Fernandes and Ann Varley (London:
Zed Books, 1998) 94.
3 LA Samy, "Cynical Exploitation of Tsunami Victims," In Motion Magazine, 22 Mar.
2005, 12 May 2008 < http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/ilobal/lasamy cetv.html>
4 India, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Draft Master Plan for Chennai: A
Short Version of the Main Report (Chennai: Chennai Metropolitan Development
Authority, 2007) 9.
hotels, retail, and manufacturing.5 Real estate prices skyrocketed,6 and there was an
explosion of new construction.
To capitalize on this growth, the state began to invest in infrastructure. They built
a highway that ran down the state's coastline beginning in southern Chennai called the
East Coast Road.' They built flyovers at key junctions in the city to accommodate
burgeoning traffic, and planned other road projects, including a rumored elevated
highway along the coastline in the city, connecting the port in northern Chennai to the
coastal highway in the south.' The city also invested in an extensive IT corridor in the
southern part of the city. They built a wide, high-speed road and two large IT parks with
over a million square feet of office space,' and eased land use regulations along the
corridor to facilitate the entry of other companies and residential complexes for IT
professionals."x The city released a City Development Plan, initially sponsored by a
World Bank project and re-vamped for a central government initiative, in which it laid
5 Four five-star hotels have opened in the city, and the Leela Palace, a domestic luxury
hotel, has begun construction in southern Chennai in MRC Nagar. A new mall called City
Centre with international retail stores opened in the heart of the city, and other stores
have opened in various locations. St. Gobain Glass and Hyundai are two multi-national
corporations that have opened manufacturing units on the outskirts of Chennai in
Sriperumbudur. For more information on Chennai's recent economic growth, see the
Draft Master Plan for Chennai II - 2007.
6 "Colliers International Asia Pacific Research Report: India Property Market Overview:
Market Conditions at May 2004," May 2004, 19 Apr. 2008 <www.colliers.com/Content/
Repositories/Base/Markets/India/English/Market Report/PDFs/IPMOH22004.pdf >
7 United Nations Development Program, "East Coast Road, Tamil Nadu, India Case
Study (Transportation)," Public Private Partnerships: Case Studies For Sustainable
Development, Special Union for South South Cooperation, 13 Mar. 2008
<http://ncppp.org/undp/eastcoastroad.html>
8 "Silence over project irks Information Commission," The Hindu, 26 Dec. 2006, 12 Dec.
2007 < http://www.hindu.com/2006/12/29/stories/2006122905280400.htm>
9 "Tidel Park," 13 Jul. 2008, 13 Jul. 2008 <www.tidelpark.com>
'
0 N. Ramakrishnan, "Partnership Pact Signed to Develop Chennai IT Corridor," Hindu
Businessline, 24 Feb. 2005, 13 Apr. 2008
<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/02/24/stories/2005022401901700.htm>
out its vision for substantially enhancing its economic growth capacity. Like in Delhi,
Mumbai and Bangalore, the city's leaders began to imagine Chennai as a "world-class-
city.""
The economic upturn and the related changes in municipal priorities towards
external economic investment were certainly connected to the eviction threat in the
fishermen's colonies. Shelter policy towards the urban poor in India had historically
involved a tacit acceptance of squatter colonies, especially those on government lands.
Now, plans for economic growth and real estate development frequently clashed with the
fishermen's use of the coastline. The City Development Plan, the most explicit statement
of the city's vision for its economic future, specifically stated that 75,000 informal
settlements in key places in the city, such as on the coast and along the city's three main
waterways and canals had to be removed to make way for road widening, the elevated
highway, and other development programs. 12 Business leaders in Chennai actively
campaigned against what they saw as the degradation of the beaches in the city. This
included not only the litter that cluttered the coastline, but also the fishermen's use of the
beach for storage of fishing gear and boats, and their practice of open defecation. A new
civil society group formed by a local businessman began a campaign called "Marinavai
Maathalam Vaa," (Come, We can change the Marina), exhorting the city and its residents
to clean up the Marina Beach, the largest of Chennai's beaches. The group placed large
advertisements in the newspapers with images of the Marina being used as a "public
toilet."'13 The local branch of the Confederation of Indian Industries also began a beach
" India, City Development Plan for Chennai Metropolitan Area (Chennai, Apr. 2006) 1.
12 City Development Plan for Chennai, 66 - 67.
~3 Pushpa Arabindoo, "A Class Act: Bourgeois Ordering of Public Spaces in Chennai,"
British Association of South Asian Studies Annual Conference and AGM 2005, Apr.
2005, 20 Jun. 2007, http://www.basas.ac.uk/conference05/basasc05programme.htm
cleanup project, as did the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority. 14 The Marina
Beach had served as the city's "lung" and its main evening promenade since the time of
the British."1 Commentary in English newspapers and websites reflected a new awareness
that the Marina was now also the public face of the city to the rest of the world, and the
hutments and trash did not fit in with the revamped image of Chennai.16
More tangibly, coastal lands rapidly increased in value as real estate. New
residential, commercial, and hotel developments that were being built along the coast
clashed with fishermen over their claims to land.17 Most tellingly, the Chief Minister of
Tamil Nadu herself attempted to oust fishermen from their land in order to build her
government a state-of-the-art administrative complex that she felt suited the increasing
economic status of the city.18
The question I sought to answer in this thesis arose from the events above.
Chennai's participation in a global economy had somehow resulted in a radical change in
local governance, which reduced the ability of fishermen to hold onto their land. But how
exactly had this change occurred? Fishermen had been able to secure political protection
for their settlements for decades. What exactly was the process by which international
14 Arabindoo 10.
5 Arabindoo 7.
6 Prince Frederick, "Fresh Wave of Hope," The Hindu, 5 Aug. 2002, 13 Jul. 2008 http:/
www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/mp/2002/08/05/stories/2002080500170100.htm
17 "Taj Fishermen's Cove: big business ousts local livelihoods," Action Aid India, 13
Mar. 2008, http://www.actionaidindia.org/fishermen.html; In Thiruvanmiyur, fishermen
fought against residential properties encroaching on the beach. R. Srinivasan, Personal
Interview, 12 Aug. 2008; Environmental groups and groups of fishermen protested
against the construction of commercial and residential buildings and hotels in MRC
Nagar, in central Chennai, which affected the ecologically sensitive Adyar Creek and the
fishing community of Srinivasapuram. Bharat Jairaj, Citizens' Action Group, Personal
interview, 25 Jun. 2008.
18 "MoU on Projects with Malaysia," The Hindu, 15 Jan. 2003, 12 Dec. 2007
http://www.tn.gov.in/pressclippings/archives/pc2003/hindu5012003/hindu 150103.htm
influences affected the right to housing for this group of the urban poor?
Cities and Global Economic Forces
There are multiple strands to the argument that international forces without the
intermediary of nation-states are directly influencing cities. The first strand of this
argument comes from what is known as the global cities literature. The global cities
literature's central insight is that even as networks of trade and telecommunications have
expanded throughout the world, the importance of place, i.e., the importance of particular
locations, has actually increased.
The global cities literature argues that recent changes in the practice of
manufacturing goods have increased the importance of certain cities. Since 1980, there
has been a sharp increase in the proportion of manufacturing exports that have come from
the Global South, and in the number of short-term capital movements - i.e. hedging or
speculation in foreign markets rather than investments in concrete plant and equipment. 9
Companies in many industries have also saved money by outsourcing to developing
nations at various stages of the production process, leading to a global fragmentation of
the commodity chain. Sassen argues that this geographic dispersal of economically
productive activities and the transnational flow of investment capital have created a need
for what seems to be its opposite - a centralized site of control for this complex network
of economic activities. The central control functions of transnational corporation
headquarters are immensely complex, and their work is supported by specialized service
firms that provide financial, telecommunications, programming and consulting skills.
19 Baker, D., G. Epstein, and E. Pollin (eds) Globalization and Progressive Economic
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 15. Also see: Saskia Sassen, The
Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001)
83-4.
Both the headquarters of firms and these affiliated service firms benefit from economies
of agglomeration, creating privileged sites of economic growth.2 Sassen calls New York,
London and Tokyo "global cities," places that serve as the command centers for the
global economy, characterized by the concentration of transnational firm headquarters
and clusters of service industries like finance and telecommunications.
Other theorists have built on this insight to argue that technological connectivity
and a concentration of particular businesses have created numerous "sticky places of
global capitalism" that are largely in the Global North, but increasingly also in the
South.21 These concentrations of firms that produce high-value added goods and services
include not only the global cities, but also second tier cities and even specific parts of
cities, like the call center clusters in Bangalore or the Caribbean.22 These are "zones of
intense international articulation," which have much greater connections to one another
through technological and economic links than to the states in which these cities are
embedded.23 In this vision of the world economy, these global cities are nodal points or
"command points" that exercise power over a world economy that is made up of a system
of cities.'
The global city hypothesis is a comprehensive vision of the global economy.
What are the implications of such a system? On the whole, theorists argue that the forces
of global capital exert a homogenous and homogenizing influence on cities that take part
2 Sassen xx - xxi.
21 Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, Splintering Urbanism: Networked infrastructures,
technological mobilities and the urban condition (New York: Routledge, 2001) 305 -
306.
22 Graham and Marvin 305.
23 Graham and Marvin 306.
' Arthur S. Alderson and Jason Beckfeld, "Power and Position in the World City
System," American Journal of Sociology 109 Jan. 2004: 812.
in the global economy. Sassen has argued that these global businesses make certain
architectural and technological demands; they demand a particular kind of built
environment, what she calls an infrastructure of global business." As a result, the
economic development strategies that cities use to attract precisely the kinds of industries
that mark global cities are very similar, and governments funnel money away from other
municipal projects to fund large-scale, usually semi-private infrastructure projects to
support such high value industries.26 The IT corridor and the East Coast Road in Chennai,
which were built using specialized agencies that had both public and private funding, are
both examples of this kind of project.
Theorists also argue that the existence of these spaces of global connectivity
within cities results in similar social effects, a phenomenon they call "splintered
urbanism." Gross spatial dis-junctures and high levels of socio-economic inequality
develop between these privileged spaces within cities and the rest of the city. The
characteristics of splintered urbanism are shared by a large number of locations across the
world, in both the Global North and South.2 Splintered urbanism is a dystopic vision, one
in which identical global nodes communicate with one another, while the cities in which
they are embedded face similar social problems. The implications of their work is that
there is a
"convergence in land uses, built forms, and social problems
in cities all over the world - ranging from upscale real estate
developments and high-end global business clusters to social
25 Saskia Sassen, "The Global City: When built environments become infrastructure,"
Lecture, M.I.T. Department of Architecture, Cambridge MA. 23 Sep. 2007.
26 Graham and Marvin 308 - 310.
27 Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen, "Conclusion: A Changed Spatial Order,"
Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order, ed. Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen
(Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2000) 249 - 275.
and economic polarization to culturally and globally hybrid
work forces, all of which operate in the context of extreme
urban concentration and sprawl." 28
Cities and an Emerging Global Urban Governance
Even as cities become important economic actors in their own right, legal
theorists are arguing that cities are also becoming important actors and subjects within a
regime of international law. International law is here understood very broadly, to include
not only international treaties and regulations, but also more inchoate forms like the
discourse around good governance, international networks of NGOs and government
actors and so on. Two parallel processes are enabling cities to become important actors
and subjects within the international legal regime. Cities actively enforce international
norms and create alliances between cities to create an international voice for cities, at the
same time that international law is "increasingly penetrating the nation-state in order to
regulate directly the actions of subnational governments.""29
Cities are taking on more of a role in enforcing international norms locally, and in
creating alliances between themselves that circumvent the traditional role of states as
enforcers of international law and as monopoly creators of foreign policy in their
jurisdiction. For example, San Francisco enacted a municipal ordinance against gender
discrimination based on CEDAW, and other cities in America have been pondering
similar measures, even though the US has not ratified CEDAW or a number of other
significant human rights treaties.'3 Such local enforcement of international norms is
2 Diane Davis, "Insecure and Secure Cities: Towards a Reclassification of World Cities
in a Global Era," MIT International Review, Spring 2008: 31.
29 Gerald E. Frug and David J. Barron, "International Local Government Law," The
Urban Lawyer 38, 1, Winter 2006: 21.
3 Stacey Lozner, "Diffusion of Local Regulatory Innovations: The San Francisco
CEDAW Ordinance and the New York City Human Rights Initiative," Columbia Law
Review, 104, 768, 2004: 768.
sometimes against the rules of the state, like the Massachusetts ban against companies
that traded with Burma, which was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.3 1
However, local movements that take public stands against egregious state actors like
Northern Ireland and Nigeria with or without the consent of the nation-state are
increasingly common.32 Indeed, cities may be the ideal enforcers of such norms: unlike
nation-states, they do not lay claim to sovereignty and, therefore, have fewer qualms
about submitting themselves to international legal obligations.33 Cities have also begun
working together through alliances like the World Organization of United Cities and
Local Governments and the Cities Alliance. They are uniting in their efforts to increase
their power vis-a-vis domestic governments and in increasing their international role and
responsibility.34 Both these inter-city alliances and the internalization of international
norms at the local level point to an increasing self-awareness among cities of their
importance and power.
Secondly, and more importantly for my argument, cities have also become the de
facto and de jure objects of international regulation, and are "increasingly used as a
means for dissemination and implementing global political programs, financial schemes
and governance strategies." 35 Cities and other subnational entities technically have no
standing in international law.36 States have traditionally held the monopoly on
31 Peter J Spiro, "U.S. Supreme Court Knocks Down State Burma Law," Insights,
American Society of International Law, Jun. 2000, 22 Jun. 2008
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh46.htm
32 Yishai Blank, "The City and the World," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 44,
2006: 924.
33 Blank, "The City and the World" 925.
34 Frug and Barron 24.
35 Yishai Blank, "Localism in the New Global Order," Harvard International Law
Journal 47 Winter 2006: 263.
36 Blank, "The City and the World" 892.
determining the rights, duties and legal standing of a city or locality. 37 However, two
changes have whittled away at this traditional monopoly of state power on city actions:
the increase in the number and extent of international obligations that a state holds, many
of which directly impact municipal action, and the push from international actors to
actively intervene in localities.
Firstly, in recent years, there has been an increase in the number of international
treaties signed by states, which, in turn, impact the rights and duties of localities within
these states. These rights and duties may sometimes conflict with cities' standing in
domestic law. The body of international law that affects states includes international
conventions and treaties relating to human rights, the environment, and other issues, and
also regional treaties relating primarily to trade and economic policies. Even though only
states are party to international conventions and only states can be sued in international
courts for violations of these conventions, local bodies are often responsible for carrying
out the terms of these treaties. Within countries, cities can be held to the provisions of
international treaties to which the country is party. For example, the city of Tel-Aviv was
sued under the provisions of ICCPR for not having street signs in Arabic as well as in
Hebrew and English. The international norms and obligations to which a city can be held
can also be understood very broadly, as in a Canadian case where a locality was
permitted by the Canadian Supreme Court to ban a pesticide because it was upholding the
internationally accepted norm of environmental protection. 38 The extent to which
localities are burdened with duties resulting from international law has been especially
apparent in cases of trade treaties like NAFTA, where local governments have been sued
37 Frug and Barron 12.
38 Blank, "The City and the World" 903.
by private entities in other countries for acts that violate the provisions of NAFTA. In one
case in Mexico, the local government was actually empowered by domestic law to
prevent an American factory from building a hazardous waste disposal facility within its
jurisdiction, but its actions were held to be illegal under the more restrictive guidelines of
NAFTA.3 9
Secondly, major international actors have been actively intervening in cities in
ways that change cities' relationship to their nation-states, and not necessarily with the
mediation or explicit approval of national governments. The World Bank has been giving
loans to municipal governments and urban development projects in the developing world
since the 1970s. UN Habitat, established in 1978, is the primary organization within the
UN that deals with human settlements." It "promote[s] socially and environmentally
sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all" by
formulating policies, standards, and providing assistance to cities around the world to
manage their problems.4 1
The UN and the Bank are two of the most important players in development, and
both of them have an explicit focus on intervening in municipal governance. Both
organizations explicitly try and impact the relationship between the city and the state.
These organizations have tried to push a local agenda of "good governance." The UN
Habitat's Global Campaign on Urban Governance attempts to promote decentralization
39 Jaime Palafox, "Compensation for regulatory expropriation under NAFTA: Mexico and
the Metalclad Case," International Environmental Law Committee Newsletter Archive, 2,
3, 2000, 12 May 2008
http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/intenviron/newsletter/aprilo0/palafox.html
40 United Nations Human Settlements Program, "History," UN Habitat, 20 May 2008
http://www.unhabitat.org/content. asp?typeid= 19&catid= 10&cid=927
41 United Nations Human Settlements Program, "Our Mission," UN Habitat, 20 May
2008 http://www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=10
of power, efficiency, transparency, civic engagement, and security, including both
welfare policies and policing.42
The scope of the changes that the UN and the Bank envision for cities is
expansive, radically altering the relationship between state and city.43 Both explicitly
push for decentralization. The UN in 1996 committed to the new "Habitat Agenda" based
on the principles of local democracy, decentralization, and participatory decision-making
processes." The Habitat Agenda was a "clear position advocating decentralization and
increased local autonomy and efficiency." 45 UN Habitat and the World Association of
Cities and Local Authorities Coordination proposed a World Charter on local self-
government in 1998, which was to become a new UN convention. 6 The World Bank has
also picked up the focus on decentralization. In a publication entitled "Cities in
Transition," published in 2000, the Bank advocates fiscal decentralization and
empowerment of local governments to take on service provision.47 Both the UN and the
Bank explicitly link city empowerment with economic growth.
Cities: All Pushed in the Same Direction?
Both the global cities literature and the nascent study of "international local
government law" argue that the effects of the internationalization of cities may not be all
positive. Frug and Barron rightly draw our attention to the normative content of these
changes. They argue that the vision of the city promoted by international actors is one
that moves it towards a "private city," in which the "goal of a city is to be a community
42 Frug and Barron 32.
43 Frug and Barron 33.
44 Blank, "The City and the World" 908.
45 Blank, "The City and the World" 910.
46 Blank, "The City and the World" 910.
47 Blank, "The City and the World" 916.
of private money makers." 48 The following sentence from the World Bank's Cities in
Transition makes their point very clearly: "Urbanization, when well managed, facilitates
sustained economic growth and thereby promotes broad social welfare gains." The
"thereby" indicates the order of priorities for the Bank: the focus for city governments
should be on economic growth, which will then promote social welfare gains. This idea
of the role and goal of city governments seems to be shared by both the Bank and the
UN.49 The global cities literature would argue something similar, that the pressure to
attract global capital forces cities to become attractive to businesses by creating a climate
of investment and opportunity, presumably while subordinating the diverse needs of local
residents.
Implications for my research question
Global cities seem, then to face a paradoxical situation: as cities become more
integrated into the global economy and into the international legal regime, their
importance as a location increases. Yet, their integration encourages them to change in
ways that may not reflect their locally peculiar characteristics, or may not reflect the
interests of local residents." This is a radical implication, and one that is frightening for
those of us worried about democracy and governance. Does increased globalization mean
that local governments will be less able to act on the interests of local residents?
The literature on the interaction between global forces and local governance
describes accurately many of the changes in Chennai over the last few years. What the
nascent literature has not yet begun to address is how many of these changes occur. In
India, there exists a system of local democracy designed to better reflect the will of local
48 Frug and Barron 57.
49 Frug and Barron 58.
o Philip Baker, New Delhi, Personal interview, 20 Dec. 2007.
residents. Especially in a case like shelter policy, it is very difficult to see why an elected
government would choose to favor the interests of a narrow real estate lobby over the
needs of 75,000 households that live on the banks of canals, riverways and the coasts in
Chennai, most of whom vote in elections.
My thesis explores this question further by looking closely at shelter policies in
the city of Chennai. I use the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board (TNSCB) as a lens
through which to view the interactions of actors at different levels in a historical context.
I look at shelter policies not only because I am interested in the subject of slum evictions,
but because the case helps to narrow the broad questions about international forces and
local governance that are posed by the literature I addressed above. The case allows me to
focus on one aspect of local governance, namely, shelter policy towards the urban poor.
The TNSCB was the primary institution through which shelter policies for the urban poor
were created for the last nearly 40 years in Chennai. While the Board ostensibly dealt
with statewide problems, its primary area of influence was the city of Chennai.
The case is also useful because it narrows the scope of international forces. The
World Bank gave money for shelter projects in the state of Tamil Nadu between the years
of 1975 to 1996, and had a significant effect on the agency's policies. In this paper, I
examine the evolution of the Board's policies towards slums and slum clearance in the
city from 1970 to the present. I use the case to make concrete the abstractions above on
the nature of international interventions in cities, and their interactions with and effect on
local politics. When cities undergo the process of economic and legal internationalization
described above, many changes occur at once, making it hard to disaggregate the
changes, their causes, effects and their interactions. By narrowing the scope to one
agency, and the intervention of one international actor, this disaggregation becomes
feasible and fruitful. The case is useful also because shelter lending was a significant
World Bank initiative, one that spanned many years and locations. Since 1972, the Bank
has supported 278 shelter projects, which provided $16 billion worth of loans in 90
countries." In contrast to other infrastructure lending, lending to the shelter sector has in
fact significantly expanded since the 1970s when lending began in Chennai.5 2
Understanding how the Bank's shelter sector reforms affected one local agency can
potentially help to understand their influence in a number of different countries.
My experience and research suggest that the process of internationalization of
cities is not as straightforward as the accounts of homogenization by the global cities and
international local government law scholars may suggest. I argue in this thesis that the
policies of the Slum Clearance Board were not merely unilaterally imposed upon them by
the World Bank, but were the product of complex interactions between the demands of
international donors, local politics, national politics, and individual bureaucrats. These
interactions were mediated by institutional structures that determined the level of
influence that international donors were able to have on local policies.
In Chapter 2, I describe the recent political history of Tamil Nadu, where caste-
based parties broke the Congress Party's monopoly on political power in India, and came
to power in 1967. These parties stayed in power by wooing voters with a mix of populist
policies and strategic patronage. I argue that the political incentives of the party
determined the policies of the Slum Clearance Board in its initial years, in which the
Board funneled houses to the party's supporters and publicly affirmed their support for
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the urban poor. In Chapter 3, I describe the entry of the World Bank into the city, and
their shelter sector reforms. These reforms were met with resistance from the Slum
Clearance Board, as it continued to practice old policies, even as it implemented World
Bank directives. In response, the Bank imposed certain institutional changes on the Board
to try and disconnect it from local political incentives. In Chapter 4, I describe the
policies of the Board since the Bank stopped interfering in shelter. These policies have
largely been imposed upon the Board from their donors, especially the Central
government whose funds have determined Slum Clearance Board priorities and policies
for the last few years. Such impositions were only possible because of the institutional
changes made by the Bank, and a change in the source of TNSCB funding. In Chapter 5,
I explore the implications of these findings, especially the importance of institutional
structures as a key mediator in the interaction between the local and the global. I revisit
the questions that motivated this research, and examine some of the potential implications
of the internationalization of cities for democracy and accountability, and suggest new
questions for researchers interested in the effects of global actors on local governance.
CHAPTER 2
Early Processes: Local Political Incentives and their
Effect on Formal Shelter Policies in Chennai
Introduction
In this thesis, I explore the question of how international forces come to affect
local governance by using the history of one particular institution, the Tamil Nadu Slum
Clearance Board (TNSCB). This institution's history sheds light on how international
intervention in the form of the World Bank affected shelter policy towards the urban poor
in the city of Chennai.
In this chapter, I argue that the early years of the TNSCB were dominated by the
priorities of the state government and the state level political parties. The lower caste
parties in the state, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the Anna Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK) first came into power in 1967. Their rise to power and
their subsequent hold on the state resulted from their populist policies, which were geared
towards attracting the votes of the poor. They practiced an extensive politics of
patronage, essentially pressing state service bureaucracies into service for their electoral
gain.
This strategy reflected in their shelter policies, which were adopted to win over
the support of slum dwellers. Central government housing policies evolved slowly in the
years after Independence, and reflected both international trends in low-income housing
and reflected what the government learned as it attempted to implement these policies.
However, state level policies in Tamil Nadu were selectively modified from national
government directives depending on their usefulness for political gain. Shelter policies
had a formal orientation away from eviction and resettlement, and towards in-situ
tenement construction, and an informal tendency to protect and reward particularly those
groups of the urban poor that parties were trying to court for votes, such as the fishermen
that began my inquiry. Formal shelter policies that eschewed evictions also enabled
savvy slum dwellers to protect themselves from bulldozers by using the rhetoric of the
parties themselves in order to win their support.
A brief note on terminology
I use the terms "local politics" and "state level politics" interchangeably
throughout my paper. Although my argument is about city level politics, municipal
elections were only instated in India in 1994 after the adoption of the 7 3" and 74e
Amendments of the Constitution. In Tamil Nadu, state level parties dominate municipal
politics. There is no separate party structure for state and city level political organizing,
nor is there a clear division of responsibility between state and municipal governments
for service provision."5 For the purposes of this paper, the analytical difference between
the municipal and state level governments is not important.
Local Politics in Tamil Nadu: A gradual shift from the politics of ethnicity to populism
Politics in Tamil Nadu were a harbinger of political developments in the rest of
the country. From Independence till 1996, a single party held power at the center, the
Congress, which was also in power in most of the states. The DMK, which came to
power in Tamil Nadu in 1967, was the first of a number of regional caste-based or ethnic
parties that have come to power in state level governments, especially in the last 15 years.
Both the DMK and the ADMK, which broke off from the DMK and took power
in the state in 1977, are parties that appeal to the lower caste groups in Tamil Nadu.
However, they consolidated their power not through ethnic appeals, but through strategic
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populist appeals and through extensive patronage - doling out government resources
legally and informally to their current and potential supporters. Their pro-poor rhetoric
shaped their politics and their policies. Their rhetoric drew in large part form the movie
persona of M.G. Ramachandran, a movie star and a leader within the DMK.
Dravidian politics succeeded because of its ability to appease the needs of various
groups of people within Tamil society that had been previously left out of power.
Congress power all over India, including in Tamil Nadu, had been consolidated through
existing elites, to whom patronage was distributed in return for votes. Dravidian politics
created avenues to power and patronage for a much broader range of people within Tamil
society. I argue in this section that Dravidian politics succeeded in Tamil Nadu by using
political rhetoric that was geared towards the lower classes for the first time in local
political history, and propagating this rhetoric through the innovative use of film.
Recent Tamil Political History: The Rise and Expansion of non-Brahmanism and Ethnic
Populism
The early rise of caste-based political parties in Tamil Nadu can be attributed in
part to the existence of a large segment of non-Brahmin elites who saw their power erode
as a result of colonial rule and urbanization. These elites were open to political
mobilization that promised to extend power to them. Unlike in the North, the percentage
of Brahmins in the population was much less in Tamil Nadu; they only made up about
3% of the total population.5s4 In practice, this meant that in villages, high status and power
was often shared between local non-Brahmin elites and Brahmins. Brahmins were
dependent on land-owing castes for patronage to maintain temples, and non-Brahmins
and Brahmins frequently shared control over these temples." Both colonialism and
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urbanization reduced the power of these non-Brahmin elites. The British formally
assigned control over temples to Brahmins, erasing the informal power-sharing structures
that existed between local elites. Non-Brahmin power was often connected to local
recognition, which disappeared when individuals migrated to urban areas." The British
also favored Brahmins in education and jobs in the cities, which placed non-Brahmin
elites at a further disadvantage."
Not surprisingly, non-Brahmin elites looking to recapture their former power
became the locus of support for caste-based mobilization that took place outside the
nationalist platform of Congress Party politics. This mobilization began in 1916 with the
creation of the Justice Party. With support primarily from elite non-Brahmin castes, who
were shop owners, land-owners and petty tradesmen, this party gained power under the
activist E. V. Ramasamy or 'Periyar' (Great One) as he was known. The party had a
radical social ideology. Periyar advocated an end to religion, because he argued that the
practice of the Hindu religion was basically Brahminical, and, therefore, oppressive.5s
Periyar attempted to broaden the party base, but he failed to expand support
beyond the non-Brahmin elite. He reorganized the party into the Dravida Kazhagam (the
Dravidian Federation, the DK) in 1944. The writings of party leaders like Annadurai
explicitly criticized Brahmin dominance, and decried the role of the colonists in building
Brahmin power."' He organized dramatic protests against Brahmins. Party leaders penned
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plays that showcased the ideology of the party, such as one play that showed an inverted
Ramayana, a Hindu epic that Periyar argued supported Brahmin dominance. Ravana, the
villain of the real Ramayana, was represented in this play as a Dravidian hero fighting
against an evil Rama, an Aryan conqueror with whom Brahmins were identified."
Despite these efforts, the membership of the DK continued to be drawn largely from the
non-Brahmin elite.61 This was likely because these ideological appeals failed to recognize
the essentially religious character of most of Tamil society, 62 and spoke to the concerns
of elite non-Brahmins, and not the concerns of most of Tamil society.
In 1949, C. N. Annadurai and M. Karunanidhi, leaders within the DK broke from
it to form yet another party they called the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (the Dravidian
Progressive Federation, or the DMK). The party publicly called for a separate Tamil state
and protested, sometimes violently, the imposition of Hindi as a national language in the
state.63
In 1957, the party began to contest elections in the state, and entered an important
period of transformation, which is crucial for understanding the subsequent policy
orientation of the party since then. They expanded the ethnic non-Brahmin discourse of
the DK into a more populist discourse with a "plebian stamp, emphasizing the notion of
the common (Tamil) man."64 In order to expand their mass support beyond these elites,
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Karunanidhi, Annadurai and the other leaders of the newly formed DMK used a new
medium: film. The leaders of the DK had always been prolific writers: they edited
journals, and wrote stories, plays for street theater, and novels through which they
conveyed the ideology of the party to a literate audience. Now, the leaders of the newly
formed DMK used their playwriting skills to pen film scripts that criticized social ills and
promoted the party's ideology of atheism, Tamil nationalism, and anti-Brahminism.6 5
They used the films to create a kind of pride in Tamil culture that not only included but
also valorized the common man. Through movies and through their political rhetoric, the
DMK was able to create exactly the kind of "common thinking we-ness" among the
vernacular classes that the Congress had completely neglected.66 These movies
deliberately moved beyond the narrow ethnic rhetoric that had characterized the early
Dravidian movement to a broader, class-based notion of the common man.
The scriptwriters and leaders of the DMK deliberately referenced the party in
their highly successful movies. Cinema theaters spread through the Tamil countryside
with the spread of rural electrification projects, and attending the cinema became an
important pastime, especially for the lower classes.67 Film dialogue, visuals and plots
emphasized direct connections to the party. For example, characters would appear in
black shirts, the uniform of DMK party workers. The party's symbol, a rising sun, would
appear in scenes. The scripts explicitly and implicitly referenced party leaders and
symbols, especially in the song lyrics. The party took pains to associate itself with these
films as well. Successful films were celebrated with party rallies, addressed by both party
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leaders and the movie's stars. 68
The films valorized the lives of common Tamil people, and took pains to address
their problems, often with searing and hugely popular dialogue. A typical example of a
DMK film was Annadurai's Velaikkaari (Servant Woman) made in 1948. This movie
portrayed the life of a domestic servant, and used it to criticize religion and the power of
landowners. Another hugely popular film, Nadodi Mannan described the ascent of a
revolutionary activist into the throne of a kingdom and described his pro-poor reforms as
ruler.
The primary means by which the films enabled the valorization of the common
Tamil was by making the hero of the films a common man who takes control over his
circumstances and overcomes his impoverished background. In many movies, this
working-class hero was played by M. G. Ramachandran, one of Tamil Nadu's most
popular actors, with whom the DMK party had a mutually supportive relationship. In his
films, penned by DMK leaders, MGR's onscreen behavior glorified behavior traditionally
associated with working class Tamilians, like preferences for certain foods, his choice of
clothing, and speech patterns.6 He was portrayed in his movies as a "subaltern
protagonist" who was the consummate hero: invincible, morally upright, and generous.70
MGR's portrayal was that of a lower-class or subaltern hero, but neither his films nor his
public persona identified him with any particular caste, giving him a broad appeal to
lower-class Tamilians.71
This valorization of the common Tamil succeeded as a commercial and a political
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strategy. MGR was an incredibly popular actor, who was effectively deified by his fans.
His fans created fan clubs in cities and towns throughout the state. When I met ADMK
party workers in Madurai in 2002, they had MGR's face tattooed on their arms even
though he had died in 1987, and photographs of him hung next to religious images in
many ADMK supporters' homes.
The DMK's popularity in the state was built on the back of support for MGR.
Forrester argues that
"always, either explicitly or just below the surface, there was a political message
in his films: the DMK is the party that does in real life what MGR does in the
film, the party that loves and serves the poor, that does battle with evil, that
delivers the oppressed."
Not only was there a deliberate association between MGR's movies and the DMK party,
there was also a deliberate conflation between MGR the man and the characters that he
played onscreen. This conflation was used to increase support for the party. Karunanidhi
invited the rising star into the party in 1953 and gave him the title of "puratchi nadikar,"
or revolutionary actor.72 Similar to his on-screen heroes, MGR himself was seen as a
protector of the poor. He gave publicly and generously to the poor in times of need, such
as during the frequent hut fires that took place in the city. He adopted poor children as his
wards. Party leaders touted his personal generosity repeatedly in their speeches, calling
him a "giver even among other givers," and comparing him to the mythical Karna, cursed
with generosity even to his own detriment.7 MGR's own impoverished background was
emphasized in party propaganda. Political posters showed him hugging an emaciated old
woman, with the caption that MGR was "Born Poor - brought up by the poor - lives for
72 Subramanian 164.
73 Pandian 102.
the poor - the child of our home."74
This conflation of MGR the hero and MGR the man enabled him to gain
widespread popularity and use it for the support of the DMK party. He campaigned
widely for the party. The party began contesting elections in 1957, and in 1967, the DMK
came to power in Tamil Nadu, the first ethnic party to come into power in the country.
MGR's support was indispensable for winning the election. His numerous fan clubs
proved to be crucial for mobilizing the electorate. Turnout rates in elections after the
appearance of the Dravidian parties increased from about 55% in 1952 to an astounding
77% in 1967, the year that they finally took power in the state,75 indicative of the extent
to which the Dravidian parties were able to engage voters. It is important to reiterate that
the DMK's success was only possible because they were able to broaden the message of
the party from an ethnic message that appealed only to elite non-Brahmins to an appeal to
the common Tamil man that appealed to a broad section of the lower class.
Dravidian Politics and Populist Redistributive Policies
The DMK's brand of ethnic populist rhetoric shaped its policies. The party's
formal and informal policies were focused on redistributing the resources of the state
strategically to its supporters to gain and consolidate power, including the poorest
supporters to whom MGR's appeals were directed.
Patronage politics and the Formal and Informal Distribution of State Goodies
When the DMK took power, its policies sharply differentiated it from the
Congress government in place before it. Congress in Tamil Nadu, in keeping with this
strategy all over India, had focused on long-term industrialization and economic
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development projects. In contrast, the DMK focused on short-term projects, because it
was from these that benefits like jobs and investment "would flow quickly" to their
supporters.76 For example, their winning campaign in 1967 promised to give Tamilians
rice at a rupee for three measures through the public distribution system. Eventually, the
cheap rice scheme was only implemented in two cities, Chennai and Coimbatore, but it
was an important signal of their commitment to serve the poor.7 7
Broadly speaking, the DMK's policies were geared towards creating state
"goodies" -jobs, meals, social schemes, land redistribution, farmer subsidies, etc. - that
were then distributed to supporters as a reward or strategically used woo more voters to
the party. Both state policies and state bureaucracies were made subservient to the party's
needs. The Dravidian governments have been frequently criticized for their extensive
corruption. However, for many low-income Tamilians, "corruption and democratic
legitimacy coexisted comfortably" because many groups of citizens were able to access
resources through these methods that were not able to before.7 8
The DMK specifically wooed particular groups of voters with their policies, by
directing state benefits to particular castes or geographic areas. The DMK established a
Backward Classes Ministry and increased quotas for backward castes in government jobs
and schools from 25 to 31%, and added specific castes to the lists of beneficiary castes.79
They increased the total number of government jobs available and again hired people
from particular castes like the fishermen in order to consolidate their loyalty to the party.
The ADMK, which came into power after them, spread their government resources more
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widely through programs like the Noon-Meal Scheme, which gave free lunches to all
students in public schools in the state, thereby reaching all lower class families with
children.
Such policies are important when looking at the Indian state, because access to the
Indian state was, and continues to be, hugely important for the poor. The state is the
largest formal employer, and citizens depend on the state for a number of social and
economic development functions and a vast array of regulatory functions. State resources
are limited, and citizens usually must go through informal means such as personal
connections or bribes to access them. The DMK government was able to widen both
informal and formal avenues of access to state resources through its policies.
Through extensive changes in government policies and by increasing backdoor
access, the Dravidian parties managed to spread government resources through a much
wider network of citizens than the Congress government before it had managed to do.
Populist Policy Making and its Effect on Shelter Policies
In considering both the populist redistributive policies of the Dravidian parties in
Tamil Nadu, and the extensive networks of corruption and patronage that have marked
their time in power, the important thing to remember is how different this looked from
the Congress government that had been in power before it. Here, a much wider range of
groups across the socioeconomic spectrum were able to access party benefits through
directed policies and patronage networks. Despite its divergence from traditional models
of "good governance," the use of populist redistributive policies and pro-poor rhetoric
shaped and limited the actions of the state in ways that were sometimes beneficial to the
poorest voters, particularly in the short run. As I detail in the following section, the
political system also determined land policies towards the urban poor. The policies of the
DMK sharply diverged from national housing policy. DMK housing policies explicitly
limited evictions, built concrete tenements in place of hutments in the same place that
hutments were located, and allowed for groups of socially capable squatters to
consolidate their hold on public land.
Shelter Policies of the Central Government: An evolution in ideas
Shelter policies in India were led by central government initiative in the early
years. Nearly all funding for housing and urban development came directly from the
central government. Policy direction was set by the Planning Commission's Five Year
Plans, which laid the groundwork for national budget allocations and policy priorities."
While there was no single policy or policies that defined the government's attitude
towards shelter, there was an evolution in the ideas of the Indian government on the
proper role of the state in intervening in urban land and housing problems."8
Understanding this evolution reveals that housing policies in Tamil Nadu beginning in
the 1970s sharply diverged from central government guidelines, and were crafted instead
to boost the DMK's electoral strength in urban areas.
Before Independence, the government had hardly involved itself in housing,
building only small amounts of worker housing. However, in the first few years after
independence, the state built a great deal of housing to cope with the enormous influx of
refugees into North Indian cities, rehabilitating 7.5 million refugees and building more
than half a million houses.82
In 1956, the national Slum Clearance and Improvement Scheme was passed, and
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many local Slum Clearance Acts, including in Tamil Nadu, were modeled after this Act.83
The Act enjoined the leaders of major cities to acquire slum areas for demolition and
clearance.84 By the 1960s, policy makers believed that strong local institutions like
planning bodies that created city level master plans would be able to plan for and
accommodate housing demands."5 They began to shift the responsibility for housing from
the center to the state.86
Initially, standards for housing and infrastructure were set very high, reflecting
the aspirations of the Indian government towards Western style modernity."7 However, by
the 1970s, the central government had already come to the realization that the policy of
building high quality, modern homes for the poor in place of slums simply would not
work to solve the problem of poor housing quality in urban areas. Official slum policy
now reflected the new understanding that the government would need to "ameliorate the
living conditions of slum dwellers as an immediate measure,""8 and there was now a
greater emphasis on self-help housing and on in situ slum upgrading rather than house
construction. The major policy initiative in this regard was the Environmental
Improvement Scheme, passed in 1972, which implemented the Bustee Improvement
Scheme in Caclutta and aimed to provide basic amenities in all slums in major cities in
the country."9 By the end of the 1970s, HUDCO, a housing finance agency, had been
created, reflecting the belief that housing finance and other enabling mechanisms needed
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to be present in order for housing production to take place."
By 1988, the shift away from thinking that the government should provide
housing was complete. The National Commission on Urbanization wrote that the state
should facilitate access to housing, but should not become a real estate developer on its
own. It suggested an extension of programs like sites-and-services. 91 Sites-and-services,
promoted widely by the World Bank, involved the development of serviced plots on
which low income urban residents could then build their own housing. The National
Housing Policy, passed in 1992, reflects the final evolution of this thinking on the role of
the state, and focuses on a market-oriented approach to providing housing in the
country. 92
Early Shelter Policies in Tamil Nadu
By the time that shelter polices were being given over to the state governments in
the 1960s, the DMK had already come to power in Tamil Nadu. However, the DMK
government did not follow the guidelines for land policies set by the central government,
as I describe them above. Rather, the DMK government chose policies designed to help
them consolidate their power among the urban poor.
There were two impacts of the DMK government's electoral strategy on the
access to shelter of the lowest classes. The policies of the government encouraged
citizens to conflate the actions of state service agencies with that of the party, including
the state shelter agencies. This conflation had an impact on the poor's access to land in
two distinct but related ways. The first was through the government's explicit policy
orientation towards slums. Because the state shelter agencies served basically as an arm
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of the party, their policies were designed to aid the party's electoral strength. As a result,
formal shelter policies deemphasized evictions and resettlement and instead emphasized
the construction of tenement housing in the same place that hutments were located, a
strategy unique to Tamil Nadu. The second was a backdoor method, in which the poor
essentially were able to negotiate the exchange of their votes in return for protection
against eviction from hutments built on government lands.
Shelter Policy: An Explicit Arm of Party Strategy to Win Votes
Initially, housing policy in Tamil Nadu under the Congress leadership was driven
by national initiatives. The central government passed its first national slum policy in
1956. Other housing-related policies were also introduced at this time, like plantation
worker and village housing. By 1961, the state established the Tamil Nadu Housing
Board to coordinate all of its housing programs. The Board managed all housing projects
in the state, ranging from high- and middle- income housing projects to slum housing. 93
Public outlays for housing in the state increased six-fold from Rs. 5.6 million in the First
Plan period to Rs. 300 million in the Fourth Plan period, most of which was spent in
Chennai.94
The Tamil Nadu Housing Board announced that it would deal with slums in a
two-pronged manner. In the congested central parts of the city, slums would be torn down
and wherever possible, replaced with tenements. In the outlying areas, 25% of
slumdwellers would be resettled in tenements and 75% in what were called "open
developed plots." This meant that huts would be razed and residents would be given plots
with basic services on which they could build homes,9 similar to the sites and services
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model later proposed by the World Bank for the city. While this was their stated policy,
in reality, very few tenements were actually constructed or plots developed.
The DMK came into power in the state in 1967, by promising to address the
economic issues faced by voters during these years. The late 1960s were years of food
shortages and rapidly rising prices in the state. The DMK's electoral victory was
propelled by the popularity of MGR and the party's promise to address precisely these
dire economic problems.
A large number of migrants entered Chennai during the 1960s, and housing for
the poor became a pressing issue. A third of the population was estimated to be living in
slums."9 In 1971, Karunanidhi, who had become the Chief Minister, created the Tamil
Nadu Slum Clearance Board, as a separate agency from the Tamil Nadu Housing Board,
to deal specifically with the problem of slums. The rationale for the creation of the
organization was stated in one of the early documents of the Board as follows:
"The Tamil Nadu Government realized that the feeble, halting, incomplete
and disconcerted measures of the past have to give place to a
comprehensive, integrated, and concerted policy to be put through on an
emergency footing.""
The stated goals of the organization were to completely clear the city of slums within
seven years, to keep new slums from appearing, and to provide basic amenities for slum
dwellers until their huts could be cleared and replaced with tenements.9"
Yet, the policies of the Board after its creation were patently unrealistic to achieve
the goal of complete slum clearance. Its only strategy in strategy was to clear hutments
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and build tenements in their place. 99 Government planners estimated that to meet the
existing demand for low-income housing - to resettle all residents from huts to tenements
and to meet new demand from poor migrants - some 10,000 new dwellings would have
to be created every year. Yet, the Housing Board had never created more than 1,500
houses a year during the decade that it operated,'" with an average annual rate of housing
creation of 850 open developed plots and only 750 tenements.'01 Additionally, the costs
of meeting such a goal in terms of land and construction were prohibitively high.
Clearance and tenement construction schemes cost at least ten times more than slum
upgrading efforts."0 2 Meeting the goal of clearing all slums with an exclusive strategy of
tenement construction would require the creation of 10,000 homes each year, an irrational
and unaffordable goal, as housing policy scholars and the World Bank later pointed out.
The Slum Clearance Board's policies are a puzzle: why attempt to achieve a
"slum free" Chennai with policies that were administratively impossible and prohibitively
expensive? One answer is suggested by the materials published by the Slum Clearance
Board during its early years. These documents, full of DMK party propaganda, suggest
that the rationale for the creation of the Board was not "slum clearance," as its name
suggests, but was part of the larger DMK strategy to gain votes by creating goods and
assets that could be doled out to voters or potential supporters. In its institutional
structure - its leadership, policy orientation, and funding sources - the Slum Clearance
Board can be seen as an essential part of the election strategy of the DMK, and a
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thoroughly rational response to political conditions.
In fact, the Board was only one part of a larger suite of policies that underscored
the support of the party for the urban poor. After it came to power, the DMK kept their
election promise to provide rice for a rupee only in the two largest cities of the state,
Chennai and Coimbatore. They raised relief payments for victims of hut fires. After a
large fire destroyed huts soon after their 1967 victory, the DMK built nearly 5,000 fire-
proof sheds for affected residents. The political importance given to this project ensured
that the sheds were built in record time.o10 Many of the first tenements of the Slum
Clearance Board were built for the most politically mobilized groups among the urban
poor. The fishermen within Chennai city were DMK loyalists, and many of their
settlements were rewarded with tenements very early on: Kasimedu Kuppam, Dooming
Kuppam, Nochikuppam, and Ayodhyakuppam were all among the first slums to be
rebuilt. °10
The projects of the Slum Clearance Board were publicized widely as part of the
DMK's pro-poor propaganda. The report released after the first year of the Board's
existence shows a fisherman returning to his newly-built concrete tenement with the
rising sun, the symbol of the DMK party, over the sea behind him.10o A book released by
the Board in 1975 had this caption below a photograph of the Chief Minister Karunanidhi
and the Minister for Housing:
"It is but natural for those who have taken a vow to labour for the welfare
of the down-trodden to get elated on seeing the schemes drawn up for rehousing
the slum dwellers in permanent multi-storeyed [sic] tenements being crowned
103 Wiebe 24.
0 Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board, "Internal Assessment" (Prepared for the
Managing Director, 2007).105 Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board, Report after the first year (Madras: 1972).
with glorious success. Here we see the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu the pioneer
leader who had conceived the slum clearance programme and had given shape to
sharing his happiness with the dedicated Minister for Housing who had made it
such an accomplishment."1 "
Photographs of the tenements constructed in the Board's early years are peppered with
captions that exaggerate the quality of the housing provided and the enormity of the
change effected in slum dwellers' lives through their new homes. One drawing of the
tenements at Ayodhyakuppam states that "but for the Indians in the foreground of this
block, it could be mistaken for an apartment in a foreign country." •'7 Another photo of
the tenements at Mambalam Tank Bund claims that the tenements which were "projected
against a panoramic skyline" were built in an "invaluable location." 10 8
In keeping with the election rhetoric portraying MGR as a protector of the poor,
much of the writing from the Slum Clearance Board is also highly paternalistic. The 1975
publication explains the purpose of the New Residents Welfare Trust, a social service
organization that was created along with the Board. The Trust was supposed to educate
slum dwellers "socially, physically, mentally, and economically." The report continues to
say that "with their help, the women folk (as a matter of fact every member of the family)
are taught as to how to live in the new environments, how to keep them clean, how to
move in society, how to adapt themselves to various changes in the social structure etc."
Most surprisingly, since most of the slum dwellers were fishermen or other manual
laborers, the Trust also taught them "to keep themselves fit."'"
The DMK also closely associated themselves with the Board by selecting its
leadership. According to the rules of the Tamil Nadu Slum Areas Act of 1971 passed by
'
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Karunanidhi's government, the Chairman of the Slum Clearance Board was to be
appointed by the Chief Minister.o1 A party loyalist, Rama Arangannal, a career DMK
politician who was also a well-known movie producer, was the first head of the Slum
Clearance Board. The 1975 book contains a photograph of him sitting beside the Chief
Minister, showing how important the work of the Board was to the DMK leadership.
Indeed, in all of the early publications of the Board that I saw in their meager library,
photographs of particular political leaders from the DMK were printed, often with
congratulatory quotes or letters from them. 1' This is in sharp contrast to more recent
reports from the Board, which are free of all political images. According to the Tamil
Nadu Slum Clearance Act, the Chairman was granted a great deal of discretionary power.
He was permitted to allot plots and tenements owned by the Board to "such slum
dwellers whom he considered eligible.""112 The Act does not set eligibility requirements
for tenement residents, essentially giving the chairman the power to direct housing
produced by the Board to worthy supporters of the DMK.
The state government tightly controlled the finances of the Slum Clearance Board
in these early years. Most of the organization's funding came from state grants, along
with some loans from national organizations like HUDCO."'13 Government orders
(G.O.'s) issued by the state government regarding the Slum Clearance Board reveal that
the organization's actions were subject to rigid oversight, suggesting how important the
actions of the Board were for the DMK. One terse order states only that the "Slum
110 Government of Tamil Nadu, "G.O.Ms.No.1137 (Housing)," 7 Sep. 1971.
1' Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board, Report after the First Year in Madras 1972;
Report on Seminar 1975; In the Field of Housing, Tamil Nadu Marches On, 1974.
112 Government of Tamil Nadu, "G.O.Ms.No.1137 (Housing)," 7 Sep. 1971.
113 World Bank, "Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project: Project Implementation
Report," (Mimeograph from Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority Library,
undated) 64.
Clearance Board should obtain [the government's] prior approval whenever it proposes to
lease out or otherwise dispose of any of the vacant land in its possession in the future.""' 4
Specific orders were also given allotting plots and designating prices for Class IV
employees, the lowest level and most numerous among government employees. For
example, in response to complaints from government servants, one government order
changes the rent for them from 10% of their monthly salary to Rs. 10 a month. 15 Another
order ends the Board's policy of asking for an initial deposit of Rs. 500 from government
servants before allotting them homes."116 Other G.O.'s set rental and sale prices for plots
and rental units."7
The early G.O.'s relating to the workings of the Slum Clearance Board reveal the
extent to which the Board's minute functions were controlled by the government
including allotment, pricing, and land sales. They also suggest the extent to which Board
functions were pressed into the service of the party's needs. Many G.O,'s state that they
are written in response to protests, suggesting how much shelter policy reflected on the
party itself. A large number of the orders relate to Class IV employees alone. This is
unsurprising, since one of the primary means in which the DMK rewarded its party
workers and supporters was through government employment." 11 9 Any protest by this
114 Government of Tamil Nadu, "G.O. Ms. No 184," 6 Apr. 1977.
11 Government of Tamil Nadu, "G.O. Ms. No 1236," 7 Nov.1975.
16 Government of Tamil Nadu, "G.O. Ms. No. 1689," 29 Aug. 1979.
117 For example, Government of Tamil Nadu, "G.O. Ms. No. 299," 22 Mar. 1974. Or "G.
O. Ms. No. 400," 10 Mar. 1976.
"' A promise of government employment was still considered to be a hugely important
access to security even in 2006-7 when I was doing my research. I was sitting in the
home of an elderly fisherman whose grandson had graduated from a local college and had
been looking for work for months. His grandson came into the house that afternoon, and
the grandfather immediately announced the news to him that the DMK government had
stopped the hiring freeze in the government, and opened up 400 new Class IV posts.
"' Precisely because government employment has been used as a reward for political
support all over India, India has one of the most bloated bureaucracies in the world, with
set of employees was taken seriously since they would have formed the core of DMK
party support.
Explicit Shelter Policies
The deliberate intertwining of party policy and the workings of the board led to
the explicit policy orientation of the Slum Clearance Board- away from slum evictions
and resettlement and towards building tenements in situ. This happened because of two
reasons. Firstly, the Slum Clearance Board provided another means for the government to
provide goods and services for their citizens. Like jobs in the government, tenement
building was a visible means of rewarding party supporters and signaling support for the
urban poor. Secondly, resettlement usually poses a politically difficult situation-not
everybody gets plots in alternate sites, alternate sites are usually very far away, and it is
not always clear that resettlement is beneficial for individual slum residents, although it
could arguably be better for the city as a whole. If the policies of the Board and the public
face of the party were as intertwined as I have suggested above, then the Board would be
reluctant to tarnish the image of the party with the political fallout of resettlement.
As a result, the Slum Clearance Board explicitly avowed to avoid evictions
whenever possible, ensuring that "tenements are erected in the same place where [slum
dwellers] had originally been living, only to fall in line with the principle of urban
renewal not to segregate [sic] residential quarters from work centres."'" Such a policy
makes sense, when considering that groups of politically capable poor residents were able
to make their votes indispensable to party power within the cities. The pro-poor urban
policies of the early DMK government seem to have been successful. Royapuram
10 million employees, and only 80,000 Class I employees. "Battling the Babu Raj," The
Economist, 6 Mar. 2008.
20 Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board, Report on Seminar, 1975 15.
remained a bastion of DMK support for two decades because of their strategic
"accommodation of many fishermen and SCs in public tenements,"'21 and even today, the
cities continue to be strongholds of DMK power in Tamil Nadu.
A pro-poor public transcript available for manipulation
The deliberate links created between the party and Slum Clearance Board policies
also enabled politically savvy groups to take advantage of the public transcript of support
for the urban poor. The actions of the Board reflected on the party. This meant that
evictions, even if they were necessary, were also linked to the party in power. Examining
my experience and evidence, I suspect that the benign public face of the Board was
extremely useful for groups that were attempting to claim their rights to squat on public
land. I do not have a lot of data from the beginning years of the Slum Clearance Board to
support this assertion, but Subramanian states that squatter groups frequently used the
name of the party in protests without authorization from party leaders in order to stop
bulldozers. 122 Since parties are so closely aligned to the actions of bureaucracies like the
Slum Clearance Board, slum dwellers were able to use protest as a means of publicly
shaming politicians to act to prevent the eviction. Despite the recent changes in the Slum
Clearance Board, this method continues to work to some degree to guarantee the rights of
residents to their land.
Conclusion
I argue in this section that housing policy in Tamil Nadu diverged from the central
government's policies. This is because of the particular political history of the state. The
electoral strategy of the DMK, in which state bureaucracies and resources were used for
121 Subramanian 206.
122 Subramanian 46.
political gain, defined its policy towards slums. The leader of the DMK, M. Karunanidhi
created the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board, not as a means of clearing Chennai of
slums, but as a means of visibly showing his support for the urban poor by building them
tenements. The structure of the Board, in which its funding and leadership were decided
upon by the DMK, enabled the party to keep strict control over its activities. The party's
needs determined that shelter policy in the state would explicitly eschew evictions and
entailed building a small number of concrete tenements in place of hutments, usually
hutments belonging to groups among the urban poor that the DMK wanted to court.
CHAPTER 3
The World Bank and Shelter Policy in Chennai
Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the World Bank's attempts to change shelter policies at
the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board. The Bank's intervention allows us to understand
the process by which international forces affect local governance by examining a single
instance of international intervention in one aspect of local policymaking.
The World Bank began providing funding for projects in the urban sector in
Tamil Nadu in 1975. Their intervention, which was primarily concentrated in the city of
Chennai, attempted to change shelter policies from that of in-situ tenement construction
to a sites-and-services model based on principles of cost recovery and giving tenure to
slum-dwellers.
My reading of World Bank reports revealed that the Bank was not able to
unilaterally impose reforms on the TNSCB. The Board continued to build tenements,
despite the World Bank funding for sites-and-services and slum upgrading projects, and
they dragged their heels in granting tenure certificates to slum-dwellers and collecting
rent. The Bank diagnosed that "politics" had interfered too much with the implementation
of their reforms. The Bank responded to the Board's resistance in subsequent project
designs, by suggesting changes in the institutional structure of the Board that attempted to
minimize the influence of politics on shelter policies.
The Bank's Shelter Ideology and Programs in Chennai
The Bank first became interested in funding projects in the urban and shelter
sectors under the leadership of Robert McNamara. 123 He took a broader view of economic
'23 Robert M. Buckley and Jerry Kalarickal eds. Thirty Years of World Bank Shelter
Lending: What Have We Learned (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2006) 7.
development that moved the Bank moved from its exclusive focus on economic growth
to looking at human resource development and anti-poverty polices. 124 In 1972, they
began giving aid specifically for urban projects. 125 The Bank's ideas about urban
problems and their ideal solutions were articulated in a series of policy documents,
Urbanization published in 1972, Sites and Services Projects published in 1974 and
Housing published in 1975. These expressed a very coherent vision of what the Bank
believed were the appropriate municipal policies to respond to the problems of
urbanization faced by developing countries, especially shelter. They attempted to impose
these policies and reforms in all their urban sector projects. Indeed, from 1972 to 1986,
sites-and-services projects and slum upgrading projects made up more than 70% of total
shelter lending.' 26 The Bank's policy prescriptions were governed by what one employee
dubs "technocratic neoliberalism": deregulation of markets, privatization of municipal
services, affordability, cost recovery and replicability. 127 Chennai, or Madras as the city
was still called at the time, was seen as both a testing ground for these new theories, 128
and as a "single-city demonstration project for new urban management initiatives." 129
Chennai was one the Bank's first urban sector projects. By 1973, they had sent a
reconnaissance team to India to discuss urban assistance programs. 130 Based on their
experiences in Calcutta and other cities in Asia, the Bank had determined that town
124 Pugh 175.
125 Pugh 173.
126 Buckley and Kalarickal 16 - 17. From 1987 to 2005, only 15% of the total amount of
money lent for shelter went to sites-and-services, although the figure is not strictly
comparable because the total amount invested in shelter has also increased greatly in the
last decade.
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planning practices in Chennai had to change from their orientation from land use
planning and infrastructure provision by the government towards a more corporate
management style which emphasized investment planning and efficient resource use. 13'
By March of 1977, a loan of $24 million was approved to fund the first Madras
Urban Development Project (MUDP), which had a total project cost of $62 million. The
second MUDP soon followed, which covered the period from 1980 to 1988, and loaned
$42 million to the state.'32 Both MUDP I and II consisted of a collection of smaller
projects - solid waste management, road and traffic improvements, technical assistance
and training for a number of agencies, and a cottage industries development program.
The two largest components were for transport and shelter, which made up 65% of the
funding.'33 The third and last direct loan for shelter came in the Tamil Nadu Urban
Development Project, a much larger project that ran between 1988 and 1997134 and
disbursed $255 million to the state.' 35
The urban projects in Tamil Nadu were considered to be relatively successful
among Bank loans.' 36 Quite a number of institutional changes were implemented between
the MUDP and the beginning of the larger TNUDP. These changes reflected the Bank's
'31 Pugh 178.
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learnings from their experiences in the MUDP I and II: that the imposition of neoliberal
values of cost-recovery on government services in India required the de-linking of
municipal service agencies from state level political control. According to the Bank's
Project Completion Reports, bureaucratic functions had to be freed from the pervasive
and detrimental influence of "politics," which increased costs and prevented cost
recovery.
What changed with the entry of the Bank: Transport, a useful example
How exactly did Bank interventions affect local shelter institutions? Looking at
the loans made to another sector, transport, is instructive. The Bank struggled to impose
principles of cost-recovery on government transport agencies whose policies were guided
by political expediency.
One of the early transport loans was given to the Pallavan Transport Corporation
(PTC), the municipal bus company in Chennai. The Bank acknowledged that the bus
company was already "well-managed." As with all components of the MUDP, the goal of
the Bank's interaction with the bus company was to make it financially viable by
recovering its costs through user fees. 137
However, bus fares proved to be difficult to change. After an "encouraging" bus
fare increase of 22% in 1976, the bus company refused to raise fares for the next four
years. This led to an annual loss of $10 million, which had to be subsidized by the state of
Tamil Nadu.'38 As a result of their experience in the first MUDP, the Bank made bus-fare
increases a pre-requisite to negotiations with the government of Tamil Nadu for the
second loan. The government complied by increasing the bus fares by 25%, but "during
137 Draft Project Completion Report MUDP I 7.
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negotiations, without informing [the Bank], the state government rescinded 50% of the
increase."'" 9 I take this to be an indicator of just how unpopular fare increases must have
been with Madras residents and how much of a political backlash leaders must have faced
after fare increases were instituted.
The Bank struggled with the level of political intervention in fares in the state.
The Bank's report after the second MUDP complains that the bus company's fare
problems remained "unresolved," and that the "bus company's financial and operating
fortunes were once again unnecessarily held hostage to the political process."" The
report also states the lessons they learned from their interactions with the bus company.
Firstly, the Bank suggests that bus fares in the state should be set by an "Expert Bus Fare
Committee ... which could only be over-ridden by [the Government of Tamil Nadu] in
extra-ordinary circumstances."'"' Secondly, in the MUDP, the Bank had disbursed the
entire money for the bus company to buy new buses at one time. They state that it "would
have been better to limit [bus] procurement to annual requirements...while keeping the
operating performance and fare revision prospects under close observation."'4 2 In other
words, the Bank realized that staggered payments would enable them to have more
control over the policies of the municipal transport agencies and would provide a bulwark
against the political pressures the organization faced.
The Bank's experience with the Pallavan Transport Corporation illustrates the
ways in which voter pressure on government service agencies prevented the
implementation of the Bank's cost-recovery principles. The lesson they took from this
'9 Draft Project Completion Report MUDP II 9.
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was that there was a need for institutional changes that would insulate government
agencies from political pressure to neglect the Bank's directives. The Bank's interactions
with the bus company are more straightforward than their intervention in shelter, but this
same pattern holds. They radically changed shelter policy to align with neoliberal
ideology, and when faced with resistance in implementing these policies, they attempted
to insulate the shelter bureaucracies in Chennai from interference by political authorities
and political pressures.
The World Bank's Policy Changes for Shelter in Tamil Nadu
The Bank attempted to radically alter shelter policies in Tamil Nadu. I have
argued above that the Slum Clearance Board's primary role in its early years was to serve
as a highly visible symbol of the DMK's support for the urban poor, and as a vehicle of
political patronage, to funnel goods from the state to worthy voters. As a result, the
policies of the Board took on a particular cast: rather than focus on actually clearing
slums from the city, the TNSCB constructed a small number of expensive tenements in-
situ, largely for groups of politically valuable slum dwellers. The Board explicitly
avowed to avoid evictions and resettlement of slum-dwellers whenever possible. To
many outside observers, the city's response to its burgeoning slum problem seemed
completely irrational.1 43 The World Bank's intervention attempted to rationalize these
policies so that the government could appropriately address the slum housing crisis.
The Bank saw its intervention in the housing construction policies of the Slum
Clearance Board as the great success of the MUDP I and II. According to the Project
Completion Report of the first Madras Urban Development Program, "the policy of the
143 Comments about the strategy's irrationality can be found in Bank documents, in Paul
Wiebe's account of Madras slums, and in Cedric Pugh's writings about the Bank's
housing policy in Madras.
Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board to build high cost, subsidized slum clearance
(providing an average of 3,000 new units in Madras per year) was almost entirely
replaced with a cost effective and equitable slum improvement program which covers
about 15,000 units annually."'" They way that they achieved this change was by altering
the roles of the existing shelter providers, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board (TNHB) and
the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board (TNSCB). The TNHB, which had earlier provided
a small number of high cost flats for middle to high income residents of Chennai, now
began to create 6,000 serviced plots per year during the MUDP I'" directly for low-
income residents in large-scale sites-and-services projects located at three different
locations in the city."4 The MUDP limited the role of the Slum Clearance Board from
tenement construction to slum upgrading efforts. The TNSCB received money from the
Bank to "improve" slums, and developed the capacity to improve 15,000 slums per
year.147
The Bank's "technocratic neoliberalism" valued three things: affordability, cost-
recovery, and replicability,' 48 all of which criteria were embodied in the Bank's new
housing strategies for Chennai. According to the Bank, the sites-and-services and slum
improvement schemes had two chief advantages to recommend them over the earlier
policy of in-situ tenement construction. Firstly, the existing housing agencies were able to
reach a far greater number of people than before. MUDP I provided plots or improved
slums for 26,000 households at a cost of Rs. 93.3 million and MUDP II followed in its
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success, by creating 50,000 serviced plots and improved slums for Rs. 238 million. 149
Secondly, the sites-and-services model was much cheaper than tenement construction.
The TNSCB had earlier been building around 3,000 units a year at a cost of Rs. 25,000
each. During the MUDP I, they were able to build or improve 10,000 units per year at a
cost of Rs. 10,000 each. 150
The Bank attempted to undermine the existing emphasis on subsidies for public
housing and emphasized cost recovery. According to the Bank's analysis, public housing
for the poor had been provided to citizens at an 80% subsidy. The Bank's policy analysts
concluded that households in Chennai could actually afford down payments of six
months' income, and could pay for houses that cost double their annual income."' The
MUDP I also increased the interest rate that slum-dwellers paid for mortgages from 4 to
12%.152 Plots were sold to beneficiaries for a down-payment of 10% of the actual cost,
with the balance payable over 5-20 years at a 12% interest rate. 15 3
Numerous other policy changes were implemented in the MUDP I and II. The
Bank emphasized giving slum dwellers tenure, a practice that had not been followed in
Chennai earlier. Design standards for services like sewerage were lowered to lower
construction costs and maintain affordability of housing. 154 The Bank also attempted to
improve the degree of coordination between agencies working in the area of shelter by
increasing the coordination role for the Madras Metropolitan Development Authority.
Resistance to Changes from Bank
'49 Pugh 188-9.
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The World Bank implemented slum upgrading and sites and services projects all
over the world during the 1980s, and they met with numerous problems. Projects were
implemented poorly and slowly, community participation was low, projects were too
complex, and there were inappropriate standards which made projects difficult to manage
and expensive to maintain. There was also no overarching institutional framework put
into place to address urban problems. These critiques led to changes in the Bank's urban
policy prescriptions in the 1980's.'55 Yet, evaluations of their urban efforts were
relatively positive, and the shelter sector has been a strong performer, with one of the
highest rates of satisfactory outcomes of any loans given at the Bank. s""
However, the Bank initially faced considerable institutional resistance in
implementing policy changes in Chennai. According to the Project Completion Report
for the MUDP II, some of the agencies used to implement the project "proved stubbornly
resistant to improvement."'15 Sites and services projects were delayed because of land
acquisition problems from private landowners, and the reluctance of the government to
evict squatters for drainage projects.'5" Neither the Housing Board nor the Slum
Clearance Board converted their entire shelter strategy to follow the model set by the
Bank, only those portions that were actually funded by Bank money. Indeed, the Slum
Clearance Board continued to build tenements after the MUDP I began, building an
average of 2,500 tenements annually between 1977 and 1981. 59 As a result, the DPCR
1'5 Genevieve Connors and Sumila Gulyani, "Urban Upgrading in Africa: A Summary of
Rapid Assessments in Ten Countries," Africa Infrastructure Department, The World
Bank, Jan. 2002, 28 May 2008
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complained that "future projects implemented by a public agency should not contain a
Bank-funded component with acceptable objectives, while contrary objectives are being
pursued by the agency with its own funds."'" The TNSCB was deemed to be a weak
partner, because, despite reform efforts by the Bank, the Board's "administrative culture"
remained "construction, not service-oriented."'6 1 In other words, despite major efforts by
the World Bank, the Slum Clearance Board continued to function according to the model
under which it was created.
Tenure proved to be a particular sticking point. Implementation of the hire-
purchase tenure agreements mandated by the MUDP I was limited. It was not till the
Bank demanded that tenure agreements were completed prior to negotiations for the
MUDP II began that several thousand of these agreements were signed with project
beneficiaries.'6 2 Yet, the granting of tenure certificates remained abysmally low. Out of a
total 81,038 tenements that the Slum Clearance Board has constructed since its
beginnings in 1970, only 10,310 sale deeds have been issued. The remaining 70,728
households live without tenure.' 63
Furthermore, even in cases where lease agreements had been signed, collections
for plot charges or slum improvement charges were extremely poor. Collections only
increased when the Bank insisted that a 70% collection rate was a pre-condition to
negotiating the next loan. '" The Bank suggested that this was due to "lack of political
Yearwise Details," Internal Document from the Managing Director.
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and administrative support for an adequate collections effort."'165
The Development Authority's powers also remained limited, despite the Bank's
efforts to increase their supervisory and planning duties. While the agency developed a
"capacity for dynamic physical and financial planning," the Bank was doubtful whether it
could retain its new coordination rule without the MUDP's explicit support.'66 Agencies
in Tamil Nadu also ignored the work of the MMDA. The TNSCB and the TNHB
continued to "follow their own narrow functions, disregarding advisory bodies and the
need for coordination."' 67
Broadly speaking, the Bank's Project Completion Reports from the MUDP I and
II voiced the suspicion that the Government of Tamil Nadu was not behind them. The
state government remained visibly reluctant to push through programs involving the
resettlement of squatters.'68 The DPCR states that there was a "not always consistent,
level of support for project component objectives from the state."' 69 It seems from the
Project Completion Reports of the Bank that most resistance to the policy changes came
from the shelter agencies' and the government's reluctance to implement policies that had
any visible negative consequences, and potential political implications. As Mr. Dattatri,
the former Chief Planner at the MMDA, told me about the Bank's shelter policy reforms,
"The World Bank had a good idea, but we did not listen."'7
The Bank's Response: Delinking State Politics and Government Agencies
The Bank's response to resistance to its policies was to attempt to create
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57
institutional structures to protect project priorities and project agencies like the Slum
Clearance Board and the MMDA from political interference. The Bank had already been
tightly monitoring the implementation of the project. During the MUDP I, the Bank sent
three supervisory missions a year to Chennai, ensuring that the project enjoyed a great
deal of monitoring, and continued to send regular missions to Tamil Nadu.' 71
The Bank suggested a number of changes within the institutional structure of the
government agencies responsible for implementing the shelter reforms. For example, they
created a Community Development Wing within the MMDA, which they later moved to
the Slum Clearance Board. This Wing was intended to help create links directly with
local communities and explain to them the benefits of tenure, and of moving to sites-and-
services projects. The Wing's express purpose was to use this relationship to improve
collection rates for plot charges and user fees, without having to rely on party machinery.
They also suggested changes in the leadership of the agencies and the project
implementation groups. They recommended that a Managing Director be appointed for
the Tamil Nadu Housing and Slum Clearance Boards,172 a post that continues to exist
today. IAS officers -who are career bureaucrats and move frequently from position to
position - filled these posts, a stark difference from the party leaders who filled the initial
leadership posts of these organizations.
For the Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project, the Bank created an entirely
new administrative machinery within the Tamil Nadu government devoted to project
implementation. Because they lacked consistent government support for the larger shelter
objectives of the MUDP, the Bank created a "high powered Empowered Committee" for
171 Pugh186.
172 Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project, Project Implementation Report 33.
the TNUDP. The Committee was created to expedite land acquisition and procurement
without resorting to government departments for procurement and without having to
repeatedly get government approval for land acquisition, which can often be politically
thorny.
The early project reports complain that frequent turnover in top management
posts prevented adequate implementation of project components. The Bank stated that the
continuity of the lower-level technical staffers at the agencies was able to counteract the
effects of this turnover.'73 In the design of the TNUDP, the Bank expressed their
preference for dealing with such technical employees by creating a Project Management
Group staffed with senior technical officials from all the agencies involved in the project.
This enabled the TNUDP to maintain project continuity even with frequent management
turnover.174
The Bank also demanded assurances from the Tamil Nadu government that
individual agency policies not work at cross-purposes with the World Bank's goals. The
Housing Board was specifically asked not to pursue contrary goals from Bank policy.
They demanded that non-Bank funded Housing Board spending be modeled on the Bank-
funded approach to shelter.'75 The TNSCB was asked to limit its tenement construction
activities to Rs. 3.75 crores a year, and specifically requested not to expand their
activities to the detriment of the Slum Improvement Program created in the TNUDP by
the Bank. 176
Of course, the Bank was able to demand and implement all these changes because
173 Draft Project Completion Report MUDP II 5.
174 Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project, Project Implementation Report 34.
175 Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project, Project Implementation Report 35.
'
76 Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project, Project Implementation Report 36.
of the most important change that they made to the operation of government agencies:
they continually increased the amount of funding they were providing for the Tamil Nadu
government, and delinked the funding from party control. From the $24 million they
spent on the first MUDP, they increased it over ten times to $300 million in the TNUDP,
over 40% of which went towards specific shelter programs. 177 The size of these projects,
which far overshadowed current agency budgets, ensured that World Bank requirements
would be met by the cash-strapped Tamil Nadu government. While the Slum Clearance
Board had initially been funded almost entirely by programmatic grants from the state
government, the TNUDP's size overwhelmed the organization's budget and reduced its
dependence on state government funds. The Bank also earmarked its funds for specific
projects, rather than providing general institutional support, meaning that its grants
fundamentally changed the functioning of the organization.
Conclusion
According to the Bank itself, these efforts at institutional change largely
succeeded. "Despite a slow start," one project evaluation report notes that the TNSCB
and other agencies "did well to complete this complex and demanding project.""178 The
assurances given by Tamil Nadu that the Board's spending on tenement construction
would not go over Rs. 3.75 crore also seem to have been effective. In the years that the
TNUDP was in operation in the state (1989 - 1996), an average of 1,515 tenements were
constructed per annum, and not all in Chennai alone, lower than the average of 2,150
tenements constructed in the 19 years that the Board had been in operation before the
177 Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project, Project Implementation Report 20.
178 Independent Evaluation Group, "Project Performance Assessment Report: India Tamil
Nadu Urban Development Project (Credit 1923-IND) and Second Tamil Nadu Urban
Development Project (LOAN 4478-IND)," Report No. 39929, (Washington D.C.: World
Bank, Jun 2007) 12
TNUDP, and significantly lower than the 4,500 or so they constructed per year in the
years just before World Bank intervention.179' The numbers provide a more telling
comparison of the real difference in scope of the Board's tenement construction and the
Bank's projects: the Bank's project estimated that Rs. 151 crores would be spent on sites-
and-services schemes and Rs. 28 crores on slum improvement, while the Slum Clearance
Board was bound to spend a maximum of Rs. 3.75 crores on tenement construction.180
179 Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board, Internal Assessment Report prepared for the
Managing Director
80Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project, Project Implementation Report 20.
CHAPTER 4
Institutional Change, Political Fragmentation, and the Right to Shelter
Introduction
I argued earlier that the Slum Clearance Board's policies towards low income
housing in the city of Chennai were determined by its control by the DMK. Its policies
were determined by the needs of the party, and resulted in a policy orientation that
publicly eschewed evictions and focused on rebuilding tenements in-situ. The World
Bank attempted to change this policy focus when it began lending to the state of Tamil
Nadu, but met with significant resistance that they variously attributed to political
influence and organizational resistance to change. They responded to this resistance with
institutional changes and loan conditionalities that attempted to minimize the effects of
politics on agency behavior.
The Board today is focused primarily on building large-scale tenement projects on
the outskirts of the city for resettling squatters from objectionable areas in the center of
the city. I argue in this chapter that the Slum Clearance Board's policies today result from
a combination of recent changes in both local, national, and international politics and
policies. The Bank's influence on the Board and its structure, followed by the Bank's loss
of interest in funding shelter programs, the subsequent change in the source and size of
Board funding, and the decreasing political incentives to interfere in slum evictions and
tenement construction have combined to produce the policies currently being
implemented at the Board.
Current Slum Clearance Board Policies
According to the Citizens' Charter of the Slum Clearance Board, they have three
methods of dealing with slums. The first is to construct tenements in the same location as
the slums, their primary policy during the early years of the Board's operation. The
second is slum upgrading, or the provision of basic infrastructure services and land tenure
to slums. The third method is resettlement of families that have encroached on areas
needed for further developments, like along the path of the new train line and along
important roads. These families are resettled near the city limits in multi-level
tenements. 18
However, both interviews with officers at the Slum Clearance Board and an
examination of records of their recent activities reveal that most Board projects follow
only one of these three methods, the last. According to their Chief Engineer, while in-situ
tenement construction and sites-and-services had been the earlier focus of Board work,
the primary focus of current Board efforts was the resettlement of slum families in large
scale settlements. Slum improvement is a holdover from the World Bank projects, but the
third method is different from sites-and-services projects. Sites-and-services projects
were designed to reduce costs while still addressing the lack of cheap and legal land for
the poor, and the Bank attempted repeatedly to end the Slum Clearance Board's penchant
for building tenements. The resettlement strategy currently being followed in Tamil Nadu
is very expensive, involving major infrastructure provision, and large-scale, multi-story
tenement construction, often involving complex engineering challenges.182 The scale of
the current tenement construction plans is enormous. In its entire history, the Slum
Clearance Board had created 81,038 tenements, more than 72,000 in Chennai alone
through its in-situ tenement construction policies. It had also created 133,199 plots
18' Housing and Urban Development Department, "Citizens' Charter: Tamil Nadu Slum
Clearance Board," Government of Tamil Nadu, 2002, 12 Jun. 2008
www.tn.gov.in/citizen/tnscb-e-2002.htm.
182 Shanmugam, Engineer, Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board, Personal interview, 8
Aug. 2007.
through the sites-and-services program of the World Bank. In contrast, its current goals
seem far more ambitious: the Board plans to build 60,000 tenements over just three years
in large-scale resettlement plots on the outskirts of Chennai and other cities in Tamil
Nadu.'83 Indeed, 12,000 tenements have already been constructed in the last 7 years in
Okkium Thoraipakkam and Chemmenchari, in the southern parts of Chennai.
While early Slum Clearance Board documents expressed an explicit policy
orientation to avoid evictions whenever possible, current documents like the Citizens'
Charter,'"8 the policy notes on the Slum Clearance Board,'85 and publicity materials on the
Board's activities" do not express any similar claims. Evictions were never under the
explicit control of the Board anyway. Although there is no explicit policy that explains
how colonies are selected for eviction, officers at the Slum Clearance Board told me that
colonies were usually selected for eviction when there was political pressure to finish a
project that required the land on which slum-dwellers were squatting." 7 Such projects
varied, ranging anywhere from high priority river and floodplain maintenance projects
funded by the central government, to new hotel and real estate developments, to train and
road transportation construction. Regardless, the selection of slums for eviction rested
largely in the hands of the Public Works Department. The Slum Clearance Board had the
responsibility of dealing with resettlement and rehabilitation issues for evicted
residents. •88
13" Housing and Urban Development Department, "Policy Note 2008 - 2009,"
Government of Tamil Nadu, 13 Jul 2008,
http:/lwww.tn.gov.in/policynotes/housing 2.htm.
184 Housing and Urban Development Department, "Citizens' Charter."
185 Housing and Urban Development Department, "Policy Note 2008-2009."
186 "Activities of the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board," Powerpoint Presentation,
(Printout from the offices of the Chief Planner, TNSCB, 2006).
87 The majority of slum dwellers squat on public land owned by the Government.
188 Manimekhala, Chief Planner, Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board, Personal interview,
However, it was evident during my research that the Slum Clearance Board had
dispensed with its explicit and implicit reluctance to evict slum-dwellers. During the
summer of 2007 when I was living in Chennai, groups of slum-dwellers were up in arms.
The city had recently published a City Development Plan in accordance with the
requirements of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), a
central government initiative to jumpstart infrastructure projects and financial reform in
cities throughout India. The development plan was written without public consultation,
and stated that some 35,000 households squatting on "objectionable locations" on the
banks of the city's waterways - the Buckingham Canal and the Cooum and Adyar Rivers
- would have to be summarily removed because they were polluting the water with raw
sewage, a questionable claim considering the high volume of sewage and the relatively
miniscule number of slumdwellers on the canal banks.
I had access to a haphazard collection of internal Slum Board documents that
belonged to one of the long time Board officers. One document I saw had been sent to the
Slum Clearance Board from MetroWater, the city's water supply and sewerage agency.
The document was a consultant's study on how the city could provide low-cost sanitation
and solid waste management for the slums on the city's waterways. The study proposed a
comprehensive sewerage system using PVC pipes to lower the cost and to build a system
that would be appropriate for the ecologically sensitive areas along the rivers. "9 Instead
of exploring this possibility further, the Board had dismissed the report with a short note:
"As it is proposed to rehabilitate all the waterways families, this study may not be
24 Jul. 2007.
89 Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board, Consultancyfor a
Comprehensive Sanitation and Solid Waste Management Plan including Low-Cost
Sanitation for the Slums Located in the Banks of Chennai City Waterways," (February
2004).
helpful."'" The Slum Clearance Board evidently chose against a feasible and low-cost
method of improving living conditions in slums that avoided evictions in favor of a high-
cost method involving the resettlement of 35,000 households. How did this shift in Slum
Clearance Board policies come about?
Political and Institutional Changes that affected Board Policies
There were two kinds of changes that may have led to the shift in Board policy.
Firstly, there was a change in the political situation in Tamil Nadu, which may have
decreased the incentives for political parties to interfere in issues related to urban slums
and decreased successful collective action among groups of the poor. Secondly, the
changes in structure and funding of the Board that began with the Bank's interventions
affected the way that the Board formulated its policies, reducing the agency's dependence
on local political parties, and increasing its dependence on the whims of donors.
Political Fragmentation in Tamil Nadu
Recent years have seen the complete disintegration of the Dravidian party support
base, with a large number of parties emerging to represent various interests of the poor.
In 1977, after two decades of working with the DMK, MGR left the party to form his
own party. He called his new party the Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam to associate
his party more closely with the original charismatic leader of the DMK, and to tout
himself as Annadurai's rightful political heir. The two Dravidian parties had virtually no
differences in ideology."9 MGR became Chief Minister in 1977 till his death in 1987.
After a brief battle between factions in the ADMK, his mistress and former co-star
Jayalalithaa took control of the party.
90 Note dated May 11, 2004, illegible signature.
1•1 R. Thirunavukkarasu, "Tamil Nadu: Civil Elections: Politics from Above," Economic
and Political Weekly 23 Feb. 2002: 698.
Since his death, power in the state has alternated between the two main parties.
Analysts have generally argued that each new election has resulted in an anti-incumbency
vote, which has dismissed the party in power for the other. However, the power of the
two Dravidian parties has also decreased considerably in the last few years. Rather than
anti-incumbency votes, a number of new parties have arisen in the last few years that
have made considerable inroads into the Dravidian parties' traditional votebanks.
Elections in the state are now being won by careful coalition building among these
different parties. New parties include the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam,
led by "Vaiko" V. Gopalasamy, which began in 1994, and polled around 2 million votes
in the last election. The Dalit Panthers of India, led by Thol Thirumavalavan also has
support in the state. The Pattali Makkal Katchi, led by Dr. S. Ramdoss, began constesting
elections in 1999, and has support mainly from the Vanniyar caste many of whom live in
Northern Tamil Nadu. The actor Vijaykanth started a new party called the Desiya
Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam in 2005. He fielded candidates in every constituency, and
surprisingly won nearly 10% of the vote share in the 2006 election - around 3 million
votes. All of his candidates except for himself lost the elections, but his widespread
support was seen as indicative of the statewide dissatisfaction with the ruling parties.'92
National level parties also have a presence in the state, including the Congress, an
increasing presence of the BJP and BSP, and the Communists. There is also a party called
the Tamil Maanila Congress. It began in 1996, after breaking away from the regular
Congress party because of the party's decision to ally itself with the flamboyantly corrupt
192 S. Gurumurthy, "As Vijayakant de-freezes anti-DMK votes in TN," Indian Express,
16 May 2006, 10 Jun. 2008 http://www.newindpress.com/column/News.asp?
Topic=-97&Title=S
%2EGurumurthy&ID=IE620060515112959&nDate=5/16/2006&Sub=&Cat=&
Jayalalitha and the ADMK. Harriss notes that Tamil Nadu was the only place in India to
witness the formation of seven new caste-based parties before the assembly elections of
2001, and suggests that this is a sign of the failure of the Dravidian movement to
adequately represent the interests within its coalition. Many of these new political
formations represent the Dalits, the lowest castes in the traditional caste hierarchy, and
other low caste groups.'93
However, it is as yet unclear how the fragmentation of political party support will
affect policymaking in Tamil Nadu. Will this fragmentation make parties less interested
in courting the votes of the poor? According to a study done in 1999, the amount of
money going towards subsidies has substantially increased in the last 20 years,
suggesting that the populist policies that I describe earlier in the paper simply became
more competitive with the introduction of new parties.'" More research needs to be done
on the ways in which populist policymaking and new political formations in the state are
related before this question can be answered.
What is clearer is that the new fragmentation of Dravidian politics has had
deleterious effects on the ability of the poor to come together to press for their rights and
needs from the government. For example, new parties have come forward to represent the
interests of lower caste groups and Dalits. Animosity and distrust, sometimes leading to
violence, between the Dalits and the lower castes like Vanniyars and Thevars has in
recent years dominated politics in the state, aided and abetted by direct political party
involvement.'95 This means that there are fewer opportunities to create coalitions between
193 Harriss 98-99.
194 S. Ambirajan, "State Government Subsidies: The Case of Tamil Nadu," Economic and
Political Weekly, 3 Apr. 1999: 811.
195 For example, in 1997, in Madurai district, a Dalit who was elected as the head of the
Panchayat was beheaded, and five other Dalits were murdered. The killers, who were
different groups of the poor.
This was particularly true in the slums of Chennai. My evidence comes partly
from my experience working with a trade union, the Unorganized Workers' Federation,
that had strong membership in the slums of Chennai. One long-time union activist
complained that the unity of slumdwellers and the working classes had been sharply
eroded by political parties in the last 15 years. She complained to me that it was "all we
can do to get them to work together even on urgent matters. These parties, this politics
has driven us apart."' 96 She was among a number of political organizers who spoke to me
about a heyday of lower-class unity in Chennai, which had since disintegrated."97
This was evident in Srinivasapuram, a fishermen's colony within the city of
Chennai where I worked trying to gather information on the rumored impending eviction
of residents after the tsunami. The tsunami, which had battered the colony, precipitated a
massive influx of money and in-kind donations into the colony. Access to these donations
was uneven, with those who had political party connections accessing much more than
others. Multiple political parties found support within the colony, and sharp divisions
existed even within the normally tight-knit fishermen's community. In the months after
the tsunami, neighbors carefully watched each other for markers of new wealth or sudden
spending sprees, indications that someone had accessed a secret post-tsunami windfall.
Differential access to donations and a lack of transparency in the post-tsunami relief
distribution greatly heightened the fissures that existed between DMK and ADMK
supporters. As a result of these divisions, the colony faced a great deal of difficulty
suspected to be from the Thevar caste, have not been brought to justice. EPW Editorial,
"Tamil Nadu: Caste Violence," Economic and Political Weekly, 29 May 1999: 1152-3.196 R. Geetha, Unorganized Workers' Federation, Personal interview, 21 Feb .2006.
'97 Nityanand Jayaraman, R. Srinivasan, and Sujata Modi, Activists, Chennai, Personal
interviews, June - August 2007.
organizing to protest the rumored evictions. Such difficulties were particularly surprising
in a fishermen's colony, which are known for their group cohesiveness and organization,
especially one in which residents and activists described a long history of successful
collective action.
According to my informants, the problem of political disunity in the slums has
actually increased since the institution of local level elections under the 74" Amendment
to the Indian Constitution, which allowed for the decentralization of political power in
municipalities to the ward levels.'98 I am not sure why this would be the case, but I
suspect that the existence of ward councilors openly affiliated to particular political
parties made it more clear how patronage was distributed through local party
connections, and made those who were left out of patronage networks actively seek other
avenues of access to power.
The increasingly common existence of political divisions between slum-dwellers
within a single slum decreases the incentives for politicians to prevent evictions and
formulate policies that allow the poor to continue to squat on public land, especially
when they face strong competing pressures from real estate and business lobbies to do
otherwise. These pressures have greatly increased in Chennai during the last ten years of
rapid economic and property value growth.
Institutional Changes
Two key institutional changes at the Slum Clearance Board have also decreased
the ability of state level political parties to influence policy making in the state. Firstly, as
I described in the last chapter, the Bank instituted a number of changes specifically
designed to reduce political party influence on the Board, many of which reshaped the
198Ibid.
Board and continue to be in place. Secondly, the Bank's intervention changed the original
funding mechanisms of the Board, both in amount and source. The Bank's third shelter
project radically increased the amounts of funding available to the Board and earmarked
these funds for specific projects, reducing the Board's dependence on the state
government for funds and policy guidance.
The Bank instituted a number of changes that attempted to break the control of
state political parties over Slum Board policy. This included the change in the leadership
from a state appointed party operative, to a Managing Director post filled by members of
the Indian Administrative Services, who are career bureaucrats with short tenures in each
post. The Bank also created a Community Development Wing within the Board to create
direct connections between the Board and slum-dwellers, thereby circumventing the
political party. Finally, the Bank's final project in Tamil Nadu with a major shelter
component, the TNUDP, was implemented successfully with the help of an Empowered
Committee made up of senior technical officers of the implementing agencies like the
Slum Clearance Board.
To a large extent, these changes continue to shape the way that the organization
currently operates. In my interview with the Managing Director, I learned that he had
recently returned from a two-year Masters course at the Woodrow Wilson School at
Princeton. When I asked him about politics, he bemoaned the negative influence of
politicians on the Board's operations, and told me that his job was to balance the interests
of politicians "who still have control" with what he believed was best for the city and its
poorest residents. Ironically, his goal for the Board echoed Karunanidhi's promises in
1970: he yearned for a "slum-free" Chennai. Unlike Karunanidhi's promise, his was a
sincere hope, and the Board's current policy emphasis on large-scale resettlement was a
step towards fulfilling his vision.
As an IAS officer, the Managing Director expected to be in his post for
approximately two years. As a result, the technical officers of the Board - the Chief
Planner, the Chief Engineer, the Community Liaison--had a great deal of power. They
prepared projects to apply for grants, and they advised the MD on what worked and what
did not. He told me that he relied on them to provide continuity and expertise. All of the
officers currently at the Board had been at their posts for over a decade, while the
Managing Director had been in his office for less than two months when I met him. The
elevation of the technical officers to positions of power that began with the institution of
the Empowered Committee continued to a large extent in a de facto manner within the
Board because of the transience of the Managing Director.
However, the most important change that the Bank made in the Board had to do
with funding. Formerly, the Board had received its funding through capital grants from
the state government, and loans from both the state government and agencies like
HUDCO.19 The first two loans from the Bank were relatively small. MUDP I made Rs.
20 crores available for sites-and-services and slum improvement," and MUDP II
provided Rs. 55 crores for slum projects."2 The Bank loaned only a part of these
amounts, and the rest came from Government of India funds. While I was not privy to
early Slum Clearance Board budgets, the early loans of the Bank seem to have been
commensurate with the budget and capacity of the Board at the time.2 2 The TNUDP
99 Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project, Project Implementation Report 64.
O "A Short Note on the First Madras Urban Development Project" 5.
201 "A Short Note on the Second Madras Urban Development Project" 1-2.
202 Manimekhala, the Chief Planner at the Slum Clearance Board, clarified this point in
my interview with her.
suddenly increased this amount to Rs. 300 crores, all of which was earmarked for specific
projects (as opposed to capital grants), vastly changing the playing field for shelter
projects in the state. The TNUDP's shelter component, entirely based on the sites-and-
services model with some slum improvement schemes, was seen by the Bank as a
successful project. The Board limited its investment in in-situ tenements, and built
significant capacity in handling sites-and-services and slum improvement projects.
Follow the Money: Central Government Influence on Slum Clearance Board Policies
However, by the mid to late 1980s, the Bank had largely left behind the sites-and-
services methodology of dealing with slums. The projects had failed to address slum
problems in many countries. The Bank realized that most countries did not have a policy
environment that dealt appropriately - or at all - with informal settlements and began to
focus more on policy issues. 203As a result, the Second Tamil Nadu Urban Development
Project (TNUDP H), which operated between 1999 and 2004, represented a significant
break from the policies of the previous three Bank interventions in Tamil Nadu. It
marked a shift from "government-led integrated urban development operations to market-
oriented infrastructure financing operations."" TNUDP II and TNUDP III, which
followed, and is still ongoing in the state today, did not deal with shelter issues directly.
The Slum Clearance Board, after twenty years of Bank interference, was left to its own
devices. Yet, it still retained the structure imposed upon it by the Bank.
Much had changed in both India as a whole and Tamil Nadu in particular, and the
relationship between center and state had also changed. India had opened its markets and
began a period of strong economic growth. Tamil Nadu was one of the fastest growing
203 Buckley 10.
* Independent Evaluation Group, "Project Performance Assessment Report: Tamil
Nadu," (Washington D.C.: World Bank, June 2007) ix.
economies. From having had a per capita income below the national average in the
1980s, the state had the fourth highest per capita income in all of India by 2001, and
ranked third in the human development index.205 Political power in India as a whole
began tipping towards the regions, with numerous parties like the Bahujan Samaj Party,
the Rashtriya Janata Dal and others coming to power in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The 73 rd
and 74 ' Amendments were adoped in 1993, and numerous states began implementing
measures that decentralized power to the villages and urban local bodies. However, at the
same time that political independence from the Central government was increasing, the
fiscal dependence on the center by the states was increasing. From the 1950s to the
1990s, Bardhan states that the "the fraction of states' current expenditures financed by
their own revenue sources declined from around 70% to around 55%." The increase in
Central government funds comes largely from an increase in discretionary spending by
the Center in numerous sectoral schemes. 206
Without the ideology of the World Bank pushing it towards sites-and-services
schemes or the pro-slum-dweller approach of the state government, the Slum Clearance
Board's projects have begun following the money. This time, it is the money of the
central government of India. The recent large scale projects built in Okkium
Thoraipakkam and Chemmencheri have been financed by money from the Flood
Alleviation Program, which provides funding for de-silting operations and river
maintenance and resettlement of families living on the river margins, the Valmiki
Ambedkar Awas Yojna (VAMBAY), which provides funding for housing for slum-
dwellers under the poverty line from the Ministry of Urban Employment and Poverty
205 Independent Evaluation Group 1.
26 Pranab Bardhan, "The Politics of Economic Reform in India," 7.
Alleviation, 207 the Specific Needs Grant from the XII Finance Commission, 208 and the
Mega City Programme. Since 2004, a large amount of funding has been coming from
Central Government and World Bank sponsored post-tsunami projects. In 2005, the
Government passed the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, which
allows for cities and municipal agencies to apply for project based funding from the
Central government for urban development projects. The TNSCB has proposed ambitious
programs for Chennai, Madurai and Coimbatore to resettle all slum families living in
both objectionable and unobjectionable locations. This project will cost an estimated Rs.
1,208 crore, and the Slum Clearance Board plans to build over 35,000 homes."' 9 The
vision of the project fully embraces the vision of the JNNURM, which aims to create
slum free Indian cities. Indeed, Tamil Nadu's municipal agencies, like the Slum
Clearance Board, are uniquely poised to take advantage of project based financing from
the central government because of their experience preparing and executing large-scale
projects under the World Bank projects. 210 By providing large scale funding to public
sector agencies earmarked for particular projects, the central government is easily able to
affect municipal governance without the intermediary of the elected municipal
government.
27 Ministry of Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation, "The Project on Model
Demonstration Housing under VAMBAY," Government of India, 23 Jun. 2008
http://bmtpc.nic.in/new/bmtpc news33.htm
208 Ministry of Finance, "Explanatory Memorandum As to the Action Taken on the
Recommendations Made by the Twelfth Finance Commission in its Report Submitted to
the President on December 17, 2004," Government of India, 23 Jun. 2008
http://fincomindia.nic.in/12memorandum.htm
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CHAPTER 5
Concluding Thoughts: Towards a More Democratic City
Institutions Matter
This thesis began with a question about the process by which international forces
affect city governance. The global cities literature and the literature on international local
government law both imply that cities are being influenced by international forces to
move in similar directions, that international agencies, a burgeoning international legal
regime, and the pressures of attracting global business have all pushed cities to become
more homogenous. This vision of the global city is frightening because it implies that
local residents will not be able to realize their vision of the city through participation in
democratic politics. Rather, international standards and interests will take priority over
local ones. The claims of the global cities and international local government law
literature are seductive because they describe so accurately many of the changes taking
place in modern cities. Yet, this literature does not address the process by which these
changes occur in democratic societies.
I attempted to unearth this process by looking at the history of shelter policy
towards the urban poor in Chennai. I focused on one institution, the Tamil Nadu Slum
Clearance Board, because this was the primary agency through which shelter policies for
the poor were implemented. The intervention of the World Bank in the shelter sector in
the state provides an isolated case of international intervention in local policymaking, in
which the Bank's effects on local governance can be closely observed.
The case surprised me: It revealed that shelter policy towards the urban poor was
not simply imposed upon Chennai by powerful international forces. Rather, local,
international, and central government forces interacted through the medium of the Slum
Clearance Board. I found that their struggles were mediated by the structure of the Board.
The Slum Clearance Board was created in order to provide another means for
funneling patronage at key groups of voters among the urban poor. Its leadership and
internal structure, funding, and subsequent tight control by the DMK were designed so
that the actions of the Board would aid in the party's electoral success. The annual reports
and other early documents of the TNSCB reveal that the party encouraged the conflation
of the political party with the actions of the housing bureaucracy. As a result, the Bank
faced significant resistance to shelter sector reform at the TNSCB. The Bank found that
politics repeatedly interfered with their reform strategies. Political influence prevented
the Board from ending its expensive and counter-productive (according to the Bank)
tenement construction policies, from collecting rent from tenants, from acquiring land for
projects, and from evicting delinquent tenants and squatters on their properties. In other
words, the influence of local politics at the Board prevented them from implementing
reforms based on neoliberal principles of cost-recovery.
The Bank imposed changes on institutional structures in the Tamil Nadu
government that attempted to de-link the policies of the Board from local political
incentives. However, by the time that their strategy succeeded, the Bank had lost interest
in lending to the shelter sector. Yet, current Slum Board policies are highly influenced by
the new institutional structure that the Bank left behind. The central government has
begun providing a great deal of funding for state level service agencies through directed
schemes that provide money to agencies without going through the state level
governments, similar to the World Bank's strategy in their urban lending projects.
Bureaucrats in Tamil Nadu are able to capitalize on the project preparation and
implementation experience they have from the Bank's tenure in Tamil Nadu to take
advantage of central government project money. As a result, current Slum Board policies
are largely determined by the central government's priorities. The ease with which
central government initiatives are implemented in Chennai could not have taken place
without the de-linking of local politics and Slum Board policy that took place in the 30
years of shelter lending by the Bank in Chennai, and, as the bureaucrats themselves
concur, without the training of bureaucrats who knew how to create and manage projects
of the sort that the Bank, and later the central government, wanted to implement.
Homogeneity and Difference
What I found most interesting about the story of the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance
Board is that the interaction between international and local forces was mediated by local
institutions like the structure of the Slum Clearance Board and the electoral strategy of
the Dravidian political parties. My thesis suggests that the dystopic vision that Diane
Davis describes as a "convergence in land uses, built forms, and social problems in cities
all over the world" is tempered by the quality and structure of the institutions through
which the interaction between international and local forces takes place. This suggests
that we need to pay closer attention to these institutional structures through which
international forces affect local governance.
This insight has interesting implications for the kinds of questions that we ask
about international influences. For example, international aid is often criticized for
removing the power of developing country governments to make decisions about the
policies in their own countries. Looking at the experience of the World Bank in Chennai,
we can interrogate international aid more thoroughly. What is important is not just that
aid is given. How much aid is given? And how is it given? Is it earmarked for particular
projects or is the discretion for spending it left to the government? Is it conditionally
given? Asking such questions about the manner in which international forces enter cities
can help us to understand the true influence of international interventions and perhaps
help to design interventions in which principles of local democracy and accountability are
respected.
Accountability and Institutional Structures
Terry Bouton has an interesting paper in which he argues that America in the
years immediately after the Revolution is a good parallel to the situation of developing
countries seeking foreign investment and economic growth today. The commonly told
story of the American Revolution is that is that it was a "victory for ordinary Americans
and their struggles for economic liberalism."211 The period after the American Revolution
was a time of high taxes and economic hardship. Bouton argues that ordinary Americans
argued for and enacted policies that eased debt burdens, promoted economic equality and
put limits on profit-making activity. These policies included limits on speculation on land
and war-debt, bans on for-profit corporations, progressive taxes, debt and tax relief, and
the creation of paper money, and state-run banks. Citizens demanded these policies not
only through "normal" political activity, but through protests like shutting down
courthouses, blocking roads, forcibly stopping property auctions of debtors and
211 Terry Bouton, "Foreign Founding Fathers: Rethinking American State-Creation as
Story about a Developing Nation and International Capital," Paper presented at the
Seminar on the Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA, 5 Nov. 2007: 2-3.
threatening tax collectors.212
On the other hand, Bouton shows that the fortunes of many of the Founding
Fathers were dependent on bringing a lot of investment from European financiers into the
country, particularly because many of them had engaged in risky land speculation.
However, European financiers were less than thrilled with the populist policies being
passed by American states in response to citizen demands. Financiers demanded certain
changes before they would be willing to invest in the U.S., such as greater protection of
private property, stronger debt collection laws, and private banking, among other things,
exactly what ordinary Americans were protesting against. As a result, the provisions of
the Constitution not only implemented these changes, but were also "designed to remove
authority over political economy from political control.""213 Similar things also happened
at the state level, with new top-down legal systems, revisions to their constitutions, and
changes in land laws.214
The institutional reforms that the Bank implemented in Chennai offer a striking
parallel to this story. Similar to the Founding Fathers, they, too, attempted to create a
shelter bureaucracy that was removed from political control. Indeed, the ideal state that
the World Bank envisions in its description of good governance is precisely that, a state
that is devoid of politics, a state that provides services based on its financial capacity
alone. The changes that the Bank envisions for developing country states radically alter
the existing relationship between citizen and state in these countries.
It is interesting to note in this context that urban sector lending by the Bank since
the 1990s has focused entirely on institutional reform. In this context, institutional reform
212 Bouton 15-16.
213 Bouton 18.
214 Ibid.
is not a benign intervention. It is one that has significant repercussions for the extent of
the influence that international forces like foreign direct investment will have on
municipal policymaking. Local institutional structures determine the form that the global
city takes. More basically, they determine the relationship between a citizen and the state
in which she lives.
Differing Visions of the City
Ultimately, the three different policies towards slums followed by the Slum
Clearance Board through its four decades of operation result in three very different cities.
The first policy is a more inclusive vision, where the poor and the rich are mixed together
spatially. The second and third result in clustering of the poor on the outskirts of the city,
a strategy which has resulted in ghettos, places with high concentrations of crime and low
levels of access to good education and good urban services. Should the decision between
these three visions of the ideal city be left to bureaucrats and financial calculators?
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